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I. INTRODUCTION 
“You know, Anne,” he said quietly, “when I am with a Hmong or a 
French or an American person, I am always the one who laughs last 
at a joke. I am the chameleon animal. You can place me anyplace, 
and I will survive, but I will not belong. I must tell you that I do not 
really belong anywhere.” 
–Jonas Vangay, Hmong refugee and longtime U.S. resident.1 
The public and the courts have begun a long overdue reconsideration of 
race profiling—the formal and informal targeting of African Americans, 
Latinos, and other racial minorities for investigation on account of their 
race—in criminal law enforcement.2 Race, however, remains central to the 
enforcement of the United States immigration law, particularly in the 
southwestern part of the country.3 In fact, the Supreme Court proclaimed 
in 1975 that “Mexican appearance” constitutes a legitimate consideration 
under the Fourth Amendment for making an immigration stop.4 
 
 
 1. ANNE FADIMAN, T HE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN 249 (1997) (quoting 
Jonas Vangay). Thanks goes to Margaret Taylor for bringing this book, which documents the tragic 
experiences of a Hmong refugee family in the Central Valley of California with Western medicine, to 
my attention. 
 2. See infra  Part II. See also  Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: 
Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 T UL. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2000) 
(defining race profiling by police in traffic stops). 
 3. See infra  Parts III.A-B.2, IV. 
 4. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
See also infra  Part III.A-B.2 (analyzing Brignoni-Ponce and its progeny). 
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At first blush, reliance on “Mexican appearance” in immigration 
enforcement might not appear problematic given the widespread belief 
that the overwhelming majority of undocumented persons in the United 
States come from Mexico.5 In fact, however, only about one-half of the 
undocumented persons in this country are Mexican nationals.6 
Unfortunately, the popular misperception adversely impacts U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents of Latin American ancestry7 who are subject 
to immigration stops in the hunt for undocumented persons.8 U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents bear the brunt of race-based immigration 
enforcement, which cuts to the core of their belonging to the national 
community.9 
Although the Supreme Court has not revisited this area of law in recent 
years, at least one court of appeals has questioned the continued 
lawfulness of reliance on race in immigration enforcement.10 The need for 
re-evaluation has become readily apparent. Indeed, the armed seizure of 
Elian Gonzalez in Miami at the break of dawn by the Immigration & 
Naturalization Service (INS) for a fleeting moment focused public 
attention on the question of whether the agency’s enforcement methods 
comport with the Fourth Amendment.11 Race-based enforcement deserves 
special scrutiny because it disproportionately burdens persons of Latin 
American ancestry in the United States,12 the vast majority of whom are 
 
 
 5. See infra  text accompanying notes 88-107 (discussing Supreme Court’s reliance on inflated 
estimates of the percentage of the undocumented population that was of Mexican origin). 
 6. See infra  Parts III.C- IV.A.1. 
 7. Latin America, as generally understood, includes countries south of the United States. See 
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY  1087 (2d ed. 1997). 
 8. See infra  Parts II.A., II.B.1, III.C.1-2, IV. 
 9. See infra  Part III.C.2, IV.  
 10. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(disregarding language in Brignoni-Ponce and holding that Border Patrol cannot lawfully rely on 
“Hispanic appearance” when deciding to make an immigration stop). 
 11. See, e.g., Jack Kemp, Show of Force vs. Law, WASH . T IMES, May 8, 2000, at A17; Laurence 
H. Tribe, Justice Taken Too Far, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 25, 2000, at A23. See also Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 
F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of suit in which family members sought to apply for 
asylum on behalf of Gonzalez despite the fact that his father wanted his son to return to Cuba with 
him). 
 12. This Article equates “Latin American ancestry” with “race,” which the growing weight of 
scholarly authority considers to be a social, as opposed to a biological, construction. See generally 
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S 
TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994) (analyzing social formation of various “races”). In the United States, 
persons of Mexican ancestry historically have been treated as a distinct and inferior “race.” See JOAN 
W. MOORE , MEXICAN AMERICANS 1 (1970) (“Racial myths about Mexicans appeared as soon as 
Mexicans began to meet Anglo American settlers in the early nineteenth century. The differences in 
attitudes, temperament, and behavior were supposed to be genetic. It is hard now to imagine the 
normal Mexican mixture of Spanish and Indian[] as constituting a distinct ‘race,’ but the Anglo 
Americans of the Southwest defined it as such.”). See also  infra  note 124 (citing authority on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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U.S. citizens or lawful immigrants. Generally speaking, whether they are 
U.S. citizens, lawful immigrants, or undocumented aliens, persons of Latin 
American ancestry or appearance are more likely than other persons in the 
United States to be stopped and interrogated about their immigration 
status.13 A popular stereotype characterizes Latinos as “foreigners” 
potentially subject to removal from the country.14 Because ninety percent 
of the persons deported from the country are Latin American when closer 
to half of the undocumented population is Latino, race profiling in 
immigration enforcement helps reinforce and legitimate this inaccurate 
stereotype of Latinos as perpetual “foreigners.”15 
The public and legal endorsement of race-based immigration stops 
conflict with the deep suspicion of racial classifications in virtually every 
other body of public law.16 Under modern Equal Protection doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has held that racial classifications are constitutionally 
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.17 The Court has prohibited states 
from using classifications based on overbroad gender stereotypes,18 
remarkably similar to the generalizations used daily in race-based 
 
 
racialization of persons of Mexican ancestry in United States). For analysis of how the law shapes 
social meaning, see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995). 
 13. See infra  Part III.B.1-2.  
 14. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 101, 117-29 (1997). See also  K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of 
Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41, 47-48 (2000) (analyzing stereotypes based on statistical correlations and 
their harms). 
 15. See infra  text accompanying notes 198-200; see also infra  text accompanying notes 42-43 
(analyzing similar impacts resulting from race profiling in criminal law enforcement). 
 16. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends to seriously curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”) (citations omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, including those in federal programs meant to increase 
government contracting with minority businesses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) (holding to the same effect); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (providing that no state 
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Because color-
blindness now dominates U.S. constitutional law, any deviation requires correction to ensure 
consistency and coherency in the law. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE  (1986) 
(articulating jurisprudential theory requiring consistency and integrity in law). 
 Reliance in this Article on the Court’s color-blindness principle should not be interpreted as 
endorsing its use in areas other than race profiling in immigration enforcement, specifically in the 
evaluation of affirmative action programs. See Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: “Driving While 
Mexican” and Affirmative Action, 6 MICH . J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2000) (contrasting legal 
implications of the use of race in race profiling and affirmative action). For authorities discussing 
objections to the color-blindness approach to invalidating affirmative action programs, see infra note 
242. 
 18. See infra  text accompanying notes 245-46. 
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immigration enforcement. Nevertheless, not until recently has any arm of 
the U.S. government seriously questioned this practice.19 
Race-based immigration enforcement, while in some ways unique in its 
express use of racial classifications, also constitutes part of a body of 
immigration law replete with disparate racial impacts cloaked in facial 
neutrality. As the prevailing wisdom would have it, Congress has removed 
the last vestiges of invidious discrimination from the immigration laws.20 
Certainly the predominant civil rights consciousness helped move 
immigration law in this direction. However, the hypertechnical 
immigration laws21 still discriminate on the basis of race in ways that 
frequently are hidden or obscured. For example, the laws establish per-
country ceilings on the number of immigrants eligible for admission each 
year that create long waits for potential immigrants from certain 
developing countries populated by people of color;22 a diversity visa 
system that, through a complicated formula, masks a strong preference for 
immigrants from northern Europe;23 a public charge exclusion that 
disparately impacts poor and working people from developing nations;24 
and a variety of removal grounds that adversely affect discrete immigrant 
communities of color.25 All of the foregoing inhibit immigration from 
 
 
 19. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 20. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963, 1966 (1996) (reviewing 
PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 
(1995)) (“[R]acism as such no longer plays a crucial role in immigration law; certainly it plays a less 
significant role than it did before 1965.”) (footnotes omitted). See also  Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil 
Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996) (analyzing the 1965 law abolishing the national origins quota 
system as a product of the “civil rights revolution”). 
 21. See Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (“With only a small degree 
of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in 
complexity.’”) (quoting E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985)); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 
38 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that some immigration laws resemble “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient 
Crete”). 
 22. See Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1994 & Supp. III 
1997).  
 23. See INA § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). 
 24. See INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). See also  Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and 
Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
1509, 1519-23 (1995) (analyzing history of public charge exclusion in U.S. immigration laws). 
 25. See, e.g., INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (listing removal grounds). For general analysis of 
discrimination in modern immigration law, see Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal 
Principles, and the Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J.  2105 (1997) (contending that various aspects 
of U.S. immigration laws conflict with liberal philosophy); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, 
Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 319 (1993) (analyzing disparate racial impacts 
of modern immigration laws). See also  Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: 
Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1210-21 (1997) 
(offering arguments about why concern with maintaining ethnic status quo in United States should not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Latin America.26 The operation of the immigration laws generally deserve 
careful scholarly investigation. 
Although focusing on race profiling in immigration enforcement, this 
Article analyzes issues that implicate civil rights concerns cutting to the 
core of equal citizenship and full membership for Latinos, and other 
minority groups, in the national community. Part II of this Article 
summarizes criticisms of race profiling in criminal law enforcement and 
analyzes the law that, although offering somewhat flawed remedies, 
prohibits exclusively race-based criminal law investigatory stops. Part III 
analyzes the impact on immigration law enforcement of the Supreme 
Court decisions permitting consideration of race to justify stopping an 
individual. Part IV sketches the civil rights implications of racially 
discriminatory immigration enforcement. 
This Article contends that the Supreme Court should prohibit the INS 
from using race profiling in immigration enforcement. National origin 
minorities stereotyped as “foreign,” especially Latinos and Asians, stand 
to benefit immensely from this reform in the law, while the costs to 
immigration enforcement would likely be minimal. Although the nation as 
a whole endorses controlling undocumented immigration, race-based 
immigration enforcement fails to achieve that goal. Mere legal prohibition 
in all likelihood would not immediately end race profiling; barring the INS 
from using race profiling, however, would at least begin the difficult task 
of purging racial considerations from border enforcement. As is true in the 
realm of race-based criminal law enforcement, prohibition of the express 
use of race would shift our focus to efforts to enforce the legal norm.27 The 
removal of race from the litany of factors used by the INS to identify 
undocumented persons would represent a step forward in ensuring full 
membership and equal citizenship for Latinos and other national origin 
minorities in the United States. 
II. RACE PROFILING IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Scholars and policymakers have been increasingly attentive to the 
issues of race implicated by criminal law enforcement,28 especially since 
 
 
be considered in immigration law and policy making); Stephen H. Legomsky, E Pluribus Unum: 
Immigration, Race, and Other Deep Divides, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J.  101, 108 (1996) (“[R]acism is a 
substantial part of today’s anti-immigrant sentiment.”). 
 26. See infra  text accompanying notes 290-98. 
 27. See infra Introduction in Part II and text accompnaying notes 59-67. 
 28. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 35-60 (1997); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/1
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the May 1992 violence in Los Angeles sparked by the acquittal of the 
white police officers involved in a videotaped beating of an African 
American man named Rodney King29 and the O.J. Simpson murder trial.30 
Commentators argue that consideration of race impermissibly taints 
investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of criminal conduct and has 
particularly onerous impacts on young African American males.31 African 
Americans have long contended that black men are routinely stopped by 
police for nothing other than “driving while black.”32 Moreover, “[r]ecent 
studies support [the fact that] . . . police target people of color, particularly 
 
 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 
(1997); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, T HE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK 
PROTECTIONISM,  POLICE HARASMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998); Colloquy, 
Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000). 
See also Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1479-91 (2000) (summarizing powerfully the endemic racism in the U.S. 
criminal justice system). Concern about the high incarceration rates of young African American males 
has prompted one influential scholar to make the controversial call for jury nullification in certain 
instances. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System , 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). 
 29. See, e.g., CHARLES J.  OGLETREE ET AL. ,  BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY:  AN 
INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995); see also Kenneth B. Nunn, 
Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 
63-67 (1993) (analyzing racial implications of the beating of Rodney King, including how the incident 
grew out of and reinforced stereotypes of the “Black criminal.”). 
 30. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory, the Law, 
and the Triumph of Color in America, NEW REP., Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, 
T HE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON (1996) (documenting Simpson trial and its 
national impact). 
 31. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (prosecution); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When 
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J.  659 (1994) (traffic stops); Andrew D. 
Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in Criminal 
Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 565-72 (1998) (various aspects of criminal justice system); David A. 
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. 
REV. 271 (traffic stops). See also  Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White 
Fears—On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994) (analyzing legal responses to 
the perceived threat to society from African American criminality). 
 32. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 425, 431-32 
(1997); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 275-88 (1999); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 333, 342-62 (1998); Katheryn K. Russell, “Driving While Black”: Corollary Phenomena and 
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 718-19 (1999). See also  Randall Kennedy, Suspect 
Policy, NEW REP., Sept. 13, 1999, at 30 (discussing controversy over race profiling by law 
enforcement); Harvey A. Silverglate, Synergy of ‘Race Profiling’ and Federal Guidelines, NAT’L L.J., 
Feb. 15, 1999, at A21 (“It is widely reported and, among people in the criminal justice system, well-
known . . . , that young black and Hispanic males are statistically far more likely than whites to be 
stopped by police cruisers for suspected traffic offenses, or for no apparent reason at all.”). Race 
profiling is such common knowledge that one scholar blandly states that “many police departments use 
racial profiles as the basis for whom to arrest.” Gregory Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary 
Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
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African Americans, for stops and frisks.”33  
Similarly, the criminal justice system unfairly focuses on minority 
groups other than African Americans.34 For example, police employ race 
profiling to the detriment of Latinos, which is popularly known as being 
stopped for “driving while brown.”35 
The acknowledgement of the prevalence of race profiling, however 
belated, has provoked a public outcry. In a 1999 speech to the nation, 
President Bill Clinton criticized race profiling and called for the collection 
of data on race-based stops by federal law enforcement agencies.36 
Numerous state and local law enforcement agencies are currently under 
 
 
 33. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957 (1999). See Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1182-83 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1996) (offering examples of prominent African Americans subject to unlawful stops on account of 
their race); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 
560 (D. Md. 1999) (addressing motions in class action alleging constitutional violations in pattern of 
racially discriminatory stops, detentions, and searches of minority motorists); United States v. Leviner, 
31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Studies from a number of scholars, and articles in the 
popular literature have focused on the fact that African American motorists are stopped and prosecuted 
for traffic stops, more than other citizens.”) (footnote omitted) ; New Jersey v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (reviewing evidence of race profiling by New Jersey State Police and 
suppressing evidence gathered as the result of race-based stop). 
 34. See Viet D. Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1998) (reviewing 
RANDALL KENNEDY,  RACE ,  CRIME , AND THE LAW (1997)); Margaret E. Montoya, Of “Subtle 
Prejudices,” White Supremacy, and Affirmative Action: A Reply to Professor Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 891, 924-29 (1998). See also  Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal 
Construction of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Members (Aug. 24, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (offering analysis through case study of society’s perceptions of 
Latino criminality). See generally CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF 
COLOR (1993) (examining criminal justice system from perspectives of various minority groups). 
 35. See Russell, supra  note 32, at 717 n.2. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (approving settlement of employment discrimination action in which 
evidence showed that commanding officers of local police department instructed officers “to target 
Hispanic drivers for traffic stops” and in which federal judge sent letter to Justice Department 
requesting investigation of race profiling); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 
1134 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (addressing motions in case alleging that law enforcement authorities “maintain 
a policy, pattern and practice of targeting African Americans and Latinos in conducting stops, 
detentions, interrogations and searches of motorists”); Nat’l Cong. of P.R. Rights v. New York, 191 
F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (contending that Latino and black plaintiffs stated a constitutional claim 
challenging race-based stops); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(addressing case in which plaintiffs claim that state police stop, detain, and search African American 
and Hispanic motorists solely on the basis of their race).  
 36. See Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement, 35 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 1067 
(June 9, 1999) (“Stopping or searching individuals on the basis of race . . . is not consistent with our 
democratic ideals, especially our commitment to equal protection under the law for all persons.”). See 
also  Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., May 5, 1999 (testimony of Attorney 
General Janet Reno) (“Racial profiling focused on conduct based on race or ethnic background [in law 
enforcement] is just plain wrong.”). Whether the Clinton administration might have done more to 
eradicate race profiling is open to debate. See Richard L. Berke, Gore and Bradley Duel, Briefly, on 
Racial Issue, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at A20 (reporting that Democratic presidential hopefuls both 
promised, if elected, to issue an executive order prohibiting race profiling). 
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investigation for their race profiling practices.37 Legislators have made 
many proposals designed to end the practice.38 Acknowledging the 
growing public awareness of race profiling, Justice Stevens argued in his 
dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow that an African American man’s flight from 
police may be caused by a legitimate fear of profiling by, as well as 
imminent violence at the hands of, law enforcement authorities; thus, such 
flight, he argued, should not necessarily lead to the reasonable suspicion of 
criminal conduct necessary to justify a stop.39 
As a nation, we appear to be moving toward a consensus on the 
illegitimacy of exclusive reliance on a person’s race in determining 
whether he or she is a criminal suspect. Should we allow, for example, 
consideration of the fact that someone is African American or Latino to 
justify an ordinary criminal stop because law enforcement authorities 
believe that African Americans or Latinos, as a matter of statistical 
probability, are more likely to break the law than whites?40 Such 
stereotyping, with its onerous consequences,41 is deeply problematic. 
 
 
 37. See Harris, supra  note 32, at 275-78; Thompson, supra  note 33, at 959. See also Debra 
Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. 
L.  REV. 815, 815-17, 816 n.4 (1999) (stating that  U.S. Department of Justice is reportedly 
investigating a number of local police agencies for engaging in pattern or practice of civil rights 
violations). The United States Department of Justice and the State of New Jersey entered into a 
consent decree prohibiting race profiling. See New Jersey Enters Into Consent Decree Regarding 
Highway Stop Racial Profiling, 68 U.S.L.W. 2390 (Jan. 11, 2000). 
 38. See, e.g., Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing for 
collection of data on race of drivers involved in traffic stops); Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1998, 
H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1998) (same); S. 1389, 2000 Leg. (Cal. 2000) (same); A.B. 1264, 1998 Leg. 
(Cal. 1998) (same) (vetoed by Governor); S. 76, 1999-2000 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 1999) (same). See also 
Jeffrey Ghannam, Trafficking in Color, ABA J., May 2000, at 18 (discussing evidence of race 
profiling in law enforcement); Hope Viner Samborn, Profiled and Pulled Over, ABA J., Oct. 1999, at 
18 (discussing legislative proposals and growing public concern with race profiling). 
 39. 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 680-82 (2000). 
 40. See KENNEDY, supra  note 28, at 138-63. However, in certain limited circumstances, courts 
have provoked controversy by permitting race to enter into the law enforcement decision to make an 
investigatory stop. See United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 112-15 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., 
dissenting) (objecting to upholding of stop despite fact that police officer admitted to considering race 
as a factor); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to invalidate stop 
and search even though Drug Enforcement Administration agent stopped defendant at airport because 
he “was aware that a number of young roughly dressed black males from street gangs in Los Angeles 
frequently brought cocaine into the . . . area”). See also  Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: 
Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 749 (1992) (analyzing use of race in “gang profiles” by law enforcement); Police and Racial 
Profiling, N.Y. T IMES UPFRONT, Sept. 6, 1999, at 36 (quoting Los Angeles police chief defending the 
consideration of race in constructing criminal profiles); infra  notes 60-61 and accompanying text 
(noting court decisions allowing race to be considered when victim alleges that perpetrator of crime is 
racial minority). 
 41. See infra  Part II.A. 
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A. Harms 
As the ongoing legal and public criticism suggests, race profiling in 
criminal law enforcement implicates an array of evils. When criminal 
investigations focus on African Americans, more African Americans 
necessarily will be arrested and convicted of crimes, thereby creating a 
self-fulfilling prophesy.42 By so doing, race profiling reinforces deep-
rooted negative stereotypes about African American criminality.43 
Race profiling also punishes innocent African Americans who are 
stopped for no other reason than the color of their skin.44 Law-abiding 
African Americans regularly suffer the emotional turmoil, embarrassment, 
and humiliation that result from race-based stops.45 Discriminatory law 
enforcement artificially shapes the daily conduct of many African 
Americans seeking to minimize their risk of interaction with police.46 Race 
profiling fits into a pattern of discriminatory law enforcement that has 
created an enduring cynicism among African Americans about the 
criminal justice system, thereby increasing the difficulty of law 
enforcement in minority communities.47 
 
 
 42. See Harris, supra note 32, at 267-68, 301-02; Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, 
Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
775, 818 (1999); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 
1507-08 (1988). 
 43. See FLOYD D. WEATHERSPOON, AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES AND THE LAW 1-30 (1998). See 
also  Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 97, 106 
(1997) (“[T]he deeply imbedded idea of a frightening Black man has some influence on every person 
in America, including every person in the criminal justice system. Each stage of our criminal justice 
process reflects and reinforces the ‘knowledge’ that Black male means criminal.”) (footnote omitted). 
 44. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (“[P]roving broad sociological propositions by 
statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with . . . the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). For a discussion of Equal Protection doctrine forbidding reliance on overbroad stereotypes, 
see infra  text accompanying notes 239-47. 
 45. See Harris, supra  note 32, at 265-75. See also  Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 
YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (analyzing impact of subtle attacks, known as microaggressions, on African 
Americans); Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1164-
65 (1966) (expressing concern that discriminatory police questioning based on probabilities may injure 
innocent African American youth); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse 
of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism , 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987) (analyzing 
severe damage to human spirit caused by racism). 
 46. See Davis, supra  note 32, at 425 (noting that some prominent African American men drive 
bland family automobiles to avoid being stopped by police); Harris, supra  note 32, at 273-74, 305-07 
(stating that to avoid pretextual stops, African American men may drive drab automobiles, dress in 
conventional ways, and avoid predominantly white areas). See also  Tammerlin Drummond, Coping 
With Cops, T IME , Apr. 3, 2000, at 72 (discussing how parents of African American and Latino youth 
teach children about ways to deal with police to avoid violence). 
 47. See Harris, supra  note 32, at 298-300. See also Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in 
the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 SO. CAL. L. 
REV. 1219 (2000) (analyzing survey data on African American perceptions of criminal law 
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Finally, one must seriously contemplate whether race profiling is 
causally linked to police brutality toward minority communities.48 The 
same communities victimized by race profiling also suffer the brunt of 
police brutality, at times resulting in death.49 This correlation cannot be 
mere coincidence; rather, it illustrates how police target African 
Americans in law enforcement. 
B. Legal Remedies 
A body of well-developed Fourth Amendment law requires 
individualized reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory police 
stop.50 Race profiles, based on alleged group affinities, generally violate 
 
 
enforcement); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (2000) (stating that 
minority distrust of police contributes to refusal to cooperate with law enforcement); William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1797 n.6 (1998) (summarizing survey data 
showing that African Americans have deeply negative views of the criminal justice system); Ronald 
Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
129 (2000) (concluding from study that attitudes among African Americans toward police vary by 
class). 
 48. See DERRICK BELL,  RACE ,  RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 9.6, at 478 (4th ed. 2000) 
(“[B]lacks and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped by the police and are, therefore, more likely to 
experience excessive force.”). See also  JOHN L. BURRIS ET AL., BLUE VS. BLACK : LET’S END THE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND MINORITIES (1999) (recounting incidents of race profiling and 
excessive use of force by police against African Americans). In perhaps the most widespread recent 
scandal of this type, Los Angeles Police Department officers framed minority men and imprisoned 
them for crimes that they did not commit. See Ann W. O’Neill, The Rampart Verdicts: 3 Rampart 
Officers Convicted of Corruption, L.A. T IMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A1 (reporting that jury found police 
officers guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice by fabricating evidence and framing alleged gang 
members). 
 49. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Three Are Guilty of Cover-Up Plot in Louima Attack, N.Y. T IMES, 
Mar. 7, 2000, at A1 (discussing verdict in case of New York City police cover-up of brutal torture of 
Abner Louima, a Haitian man); Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All 
Charges, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1 (reporting on acquittal of police officers who killed 
unarmed black man, Amadou Diallo, with forty-one shots in front of his apartment building). See also 
Charles J. Ogletree Jr. & Henry Louis Gates Jr., Would a European Diallo Be Dead?, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 2000, at M5 (calling for federal investigation of Diallo killing and questioning whether police 
would have killed him if he were white). 
 50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989) (stating that reasonable suspicion requires particularized suspicion and “‘some minimal level of 
objective justification’ for making the stop”) (citation omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) 
(emphasizing that reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop calls for more than a mere “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  § 3.8, at 202-16 (2d ed. 1992) (summarizing law governing investigatory 
stops). Some contend, however, that both the vagueness of the “reasonable suspicion” standard and the 
discretion that it leaves to police officers contribute to race profiling. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. 
Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 
(1998).  
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the law,51 even with the Supreme Court’s constriction of Fourth 
Amendment protections over the last several decades.52 
Unfortunately, courts have not been particularly sensitive to the 
possibility that race influences criminal law enforcement.53 In Whren v. 
United States, for example, the Supreme Court refused to consider 
whether race motivated a stop as long as police had probable cause that the 
person stopped had committed a traffic violation.54 Although the Court 
made it clear that selective enforcement of the laws based on race may be 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause,55 a heavy burden of proof 
 
 
 51. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (holding that law enforcement 
officers “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of 
criminal activity” to make an investigatory stop); United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 
1492 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that reasonable suspicion cannot be “based on broad profiles which cast 
suspicion on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person 
to be stopped”); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the 
Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 105 (1999) 
(“Something more than a purely probabilistic inference of suspicion based on statistical likelihoods 
must be present to justify a stop.”). However, some factors relied on by officers in formulating 
reasonable suspicion may correlate with race. See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The 
Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 44 (1994). 
 52. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (holding that unprovoked flight in high 
crime area constitutes reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop); Florida v. 
White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (holding that police did not need warrant before seizing automobile from 
public place when police had probable cause to believe that automobile was forfeitable contraband); 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (upholding search of purse after finding of contraband on 
passenger in automobile); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that persons in apartment 
for brief period lack reasonable expectation of privacy against searches and seizures); Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (finding that Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer to 
inform “lawfully seized defendant . . . that he is ‘free to go’ before his consent to search will be 
recognized as voluntary”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment requirements are satisfied even if police traffic stop was race-based). But cf. Dickerson v. 
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (refusing to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 53. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (refusing to disturb conviction in which 
police-based stop of defendant on fact  that individual fled upon seeing police patrol in area known for 
heavy narcotics trafficking, despite fact that innocent persons, particularly racial minorities, might flee 
police out of fear for personal safety); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to disturb 
death penalty sentence of African American man in face of statistical evidence that imposition of death 
penalty in Georgia appeared to correlate with race). But cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 
(1999) (invalidating “gang congregation” ordinance that arguably had disparate impact on minority 
youth). 
 54. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). For criticism of the Court’s refusal in Whren to consider the influence 
of race on police conduct in its Fourth Amendment analysis, see David A. Harris, “Driving While 
Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); Davis, supra  note 32, at 432-42; Maclin, supra note 32; Thompson, 
supra  note 33, at 978-83. See also  Lisa Walter, Comment, Eradicating Racial Stereotyping from Terry 
Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 255 (2000) 
(contending that exclusionary rule under Equal Protection Clause was necessary to address racial 
targeting in stops). 
 55. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. See also  Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming award of damages in civil rights action alleging racial bias in stop and search by police); 
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attaches to such claims.56 
Legally speaking, race profiling in law enforcement implicates 
complex and interrelated Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection values. 
Significantly, Fourth Amendment law, with its focus on reasonable 
suspicion to justify a stop, often remains blind to the influence of race on 
law enforcement.57 At the same time, the Supreme Court’s reliance on the 
Equal Protection Clause as the vindicator of the nondiscrimination 
principle fails to acknowledge how the rigorous evidentiary burden of 
proving such a claim greatly limits the number of claims that are 
brought.58 
Despite legal prohibition, stops based on race still result from express 
policy, such as drug courier profiles that incorporate race, informal policy, 
or individual officers’ conscious or unconscious biases.59 Such unlawful 
race profiling differs factually and legally from investigatory stops of 
African Americans after a victim has identified a black person as the 
perpetrator of a crime. For example, in Brown v. City of Oneonta , the court 
of appeals dismissed a civil rights action against police for stopping 
African American men because a crime victim had identified the assailant 
 
 
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (invalidating state sentencing scheme under Minnesota 
Constitution because of racial disparities); City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (invalidating stop based in part on the fact that white person was in a racially mixed 
neighborhood); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (providing that state cannot deny persons within 
its jurisdiction equal protection of the law). 
 56. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (announcing requirement that to 
prevail on Equal Protection claim plaintiff must establish that State actor had a “discriminatory 
purpose”). See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465-71 (1996) (finding that intent 
necessary for selective enforcement claim had not been proven even though over ninety percent of 
persons convicted of crack cocaine trafficking were African American). See also Theodore Eisenberg 
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1151 (1991) (presenting results of empirical study showing negative impacts on plaintiffs 
seeking to prove Equal Protection claims); Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some 
Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 S. CT. REV. 141, 176 n.157 (observing limitations on proving 
selective enforcement claim mentioned in Whren). The intent requirement for proving an Equal 
Protection claim has been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: 
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1976); Barbara J. Flagg, 
“Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory 
Intent, 91 MICH . L. REV. 953 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism , 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional 
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000). 
Plaintiffs in some cases, however, have been able to establish such a discriminatory intent. See, e.g., 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating Alabama constitutional provision 
disenfranchising certain convicted criminals because the provision was motivated by racial animus); 
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (finding that at -large electoral scheme was maintained for 
discriminatory purpose). 
 57. See supra  notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra  text accompanying notes 55-56. 
 59. See Russell, supra  note 32, at 717-18 n.2. 
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as black.60 In so doing, the court emphasized that no allegations existed 
that “the police used an established profile of violent criminals to 
determine that the suspect must have been black” or that the police had “a 
regular policy based upon racial stereotypes that all black . . . residents be 
questioned whenever a violent crime is reported.”61 
Although perhaps more theoretical than practical, remedies exist to 
punish and deter racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.62 The 
law establishes that African Americans and other racial minorities cannot 
lawfully be stopped for criminal investigation solely because of their 
alleged propensity for criminal conduct.63 Individualized suspicion is 
necessary to justify an investigatory stop.64 To the extent that law 
enforcement remains discriminatory, scholars, activists, and policymakers 
search for solutions.65 Our society faces the age-old problem of bringing 
the “law in action” into line with the “law in books.”66 Even with the 
divergence, the law’s aspirations have helped fuel efforts to end race 
profiling in criminal law enforcement and its enduring injury to African 
American dignity.67 Immigration law enforcement for Latinos, however, 
differs dramatically. 
III. RACE PROFILING IN IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Part II of this Article outlined the phenomenon of race profiling in 
criminal law enforcement, its harms, and its legal remedies.68 Race 
profiling also remains part and parcel of the enforcement of a body of 
immigration law that has evolved under the influence, if not the command, 
 
 
 60. 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999). See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1976). Factual aspects of the Oneonta case raise 
troubling Equal Protection questions. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 
T UL. L. REV. 1945, 1947-48 & n.8 (1993) (contending that incident was part of pattern of police 
harassment of African American students in college town); Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, N.Y. 
T IMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29 (criticizing fact that police in Oneonta  made efforts to stop and question 
every young African American male in small, predominantly white community). The court’s rejection 
of the Equal Protection claim suggests the difficulty facing plaintiffs seeking to establish the requisite 
discriminatory intent for an Equal Protection violation. See Oneonta , 195 F.3d at 118-20; supra text 
accompanying notes 55-56. 
 61. Oneonta , 195 F.3d at 119. 
 62. See supra  text accompanying notes 52-61. 
 63. See supra  notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra  note 50 and accompanying text. 
 65. See supra  Introduction in Part II. 
 66. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 67. See supra  text accompanying notes 36-39 (discussing efforts to end race profiling). 
 68. See supra  Part II. 
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of the plenary power doctrine.69  
The judiciary historically has taken a hands-off approach toward 
immigration law and its enforcement because of the plenary power 
doctrine. This doctrine, originally enunciated by the Supreme Court in The 
Chinese Exclusion Case,70 effectively immunizes from judicial review the 
substantive provisions of the immigration laws governing the admission of 
immigrants into the United States on the ground that Congress has plenary 
power to decide such matters.71 Under this doctrine, the Court refused to 
disturb the Chinese exclusion laws of the late 1800s, which severely 
restricted Chinese immigration to the United States.72 In 1924, with the 
plenary power doctrine as a shield, Congress sought to reclaim the 
nation’s racial and ethnic balance and enacted the national origins quota 
system, which favored northern European immigration at the expense of 
that from southern and eastern Europe and Asia.73 Justice Frankfurter’s 
 
 
 69. For analysis of the centrality of race to the U.S. immigration laws, see Kevin R. Johnson, 
Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal 
Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525. 
 70. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 71. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-18, at 967-77 (3d ed. 
2000) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence on Congressional power over immigration and 
naturalization). Consistent with the discretion afforded the United States government with respect to 
noncitizens entering the United States, the Supreme Court also affords the federal government much 
leeway in its conduct outside the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655 (1992) (holding that forcible abduction by U.S. government of foreign national in Mexico did not 
provide a defense to criminal prosecution in U.S. courts); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to search and seizure by 
U.S. agents of “property owned by a nonrespondent alien and located in foreign country”). See also 
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that fear of foreign prosecution was beyond the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination); Diane Marie Amann, A 
Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1201 (1998) (contending that witness should be able to invoke Fifth Amendment 
privilege based on fear of foreign prosecution). These cases illustrate the continuing importance of 
territoriality to U.S. law, which is especially true in the realm of immigration. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. 
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that putative refugees did not have any legal right to apply 
for relief when interdicted outside United States); Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 
1424-26 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE 
L.J. 909 (1991) (analyzing territorial, geographical, and alienage limitations on scope of constitutional 
protections). 
 72. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (refusing to disturb 
deportation law discriminating against Chinese immigrants); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 
581 (upholding Chinese exclusion law in face of constitutional challenge). See generally BILL ONG 
HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA T HROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 19-
36 (1993) (summarizing history of anti-Chinese immigration laws); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH 
AS T IGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) 
(reviewing genesis and enforcement of Chinese exclusion laws). 
 73. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952). See also 
SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY , U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
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words capture the essence of the plenary power doctrine: “whether 
immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have 
reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the 
responsibility belongs to Congress.”74 Thus, under traditional immigration 
law, racial exclusions are not necessarily suspect and are subject to limited 
judicial review.75 
Prominent commentators have forcefully challenged the plenary power 
doctrine’s logic, which over time has become increasingly anamolous with 
the civil rights revolution in constitutional law during the twentieth 
century.76 The Supreme Court, however, has not disturbed the doctrine and 
sporadically invokes it.77 Significantly, the Court decided cases permitting 
reliance on race in immigration enforcement years after the equal 
 
 
POLICY  183-99 (1981) (summarizing events culminating in passage of quota system). See generally 
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (2d ed. 
1988) (analyzing nativism in United States, including that culminating in congressional passage of 
national origins quota system); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: 
EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE  (1998) (recounting history of nativism directed 
toward white ethnic immigrants); DESMOND KING, MAKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE DIVERSE DEMOCRACY  (2000) (discussing social and political forces leading to 
enactment of quota system). For analysis of how the administrative law developed under the Chinese 
exclusion laws affected the evolution of administrative law generally, see Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating 
Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State (May 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 74. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. , concurring) (refusing 
to disturb deportation of lawful permanent residents on grounds of political ideology). Aliens who 
have entered the country and who are in removal proceedings, however, enjoy procedural due process 
protections. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). The 
harshness of the plenary power doctrine has encouraged the development of due process safeguards, as 
well as liberal interpretation of the immigration laws favoring aliens. See Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
 75. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–34 
(1984). See also  Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1839 (1993) (“[I]mmigration law has included anomalies, and even barbarities, 
that would be tolerated in no other field of regulation.”) (citation omitted). 
 76. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process 
Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 122-31 (1998) (summarizing themes common to scholarly criticism of 
plenary power doctrine). See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS,  BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last 
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1998); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law 
and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255.  
 77. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
For the latest on the doctrine in light of the Supreme Court’s splintered decision in Miller v. Albright, 
523 U.S. 420 (1998), see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of 
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 S. CT. 
REV. 1. 
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protection watershed of Brown v. Board of Education.78 The existing legal 
anomaly thus remains: racial classifications are suspect under current 
Equal Protection doctrine except for those in immigration laws.79 
Although technically limited to review of the law governing the 
admission of immigrants, the judicial deference embraced by the plenary 
power doctrine at times surreptitiously influences the rights afforded aliens 
present in the United States.80 Courts, for example, have upheld indefinite 
detention of Cuban migrants that the Cuban government would not allow 
to return, when immigration courts ordered them removed from the United 
States.81 Indefinite confinement of U.S. citizens under such circumstances 
 
 
 78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 n.38 (“The one clear instance of the Supreme Court’s allowing race (or national 
origin) to be used as a basis for classifying people (since Brown [v. Board of Education]) is United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce . . . .”). 
 79. For a different view, see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative 
Apology and Prediction for our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000). See also  PETER H. SCHUCK , CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 139 
(2000) (dismissing claim that U.S. immigration law was influenced by nativism and restrictionist 
fervor in the 1990s).  
 80. See Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the 
Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1127-53 (1995). See, 
e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993) (relying on plenary power doctrine and upholding 
INS policy of detaining juvenile aliens in face of due process challenge); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67, 79-80 (1976) (rejecting constitutional challenge to exclusion of lawful permanent residents from 
certain federal medical benefits and emphasizing that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied 
to citizens”). John Hart Ely has forcefully contended that because aliens are a discrete and insular 
minority, alienage classifications deserve heightened judicial scrutiny. See JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 161-62 (1980). See also LAURENCE H. 
T RIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-23, at 1545-46 (2d ed. 1988) (“[I]t is clear that aliens 
historically suffered from prejudice and bias and, as ‘an identifiable class of persons . . . , are already 
subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community.’”) (quoting Hampton v. Mow 
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (footnotes omitted)).  
 81. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995); Guzman v. Tippy, 130 
F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (5th Cir. 
1993), amended, 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993). See also  Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that continued detention of Vietnamese refugee subject to removal from country was 
authorized by law), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000). But see Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 824-25, 
827-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Barrera-Echaverria  on ground that unlike case before court, it 
involved an excludable, not deportable, alien and finding that indefinite detention of deportable alien 
was not permitted under statute), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000). For criticism of Barrera-
Echaverria  and similar cases, see Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The 
Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589, 
625-27 (1995); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons From the 
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 935-36, 997-1000 (1995). Indefinite 
incarceration resulted in the December 1999 crisis in a Louisiana prison in which Cuban inmates took 
hostages to secure their return to Cuba. See Marc Lacey with David Firestone, In Rare Deal, U.S. and 
Cuba Halt Standoff, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at A1. 
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would be plainly unconstitutional.82 This deviation from ordinary public 
law is consistent with the general perception that immigration law, broadly 
defined, is not subject to the constraints of the Constitution.83 From a 
doctrinal standpoint, however, race-based immigration enforcement that 
affects the rights of persons present in the country cannot be shielded from 
judicial review by the plenary power doctrine, which governs Congress’s 
power to establish criteria for admission of immigrants into the country. 
This section summarizes the current state of immigration law 
enforcement and how it operates in practice. It then analyzes the propriety 
of the Border Patrol’s reliance on race in immigration enforcement. The 
conventional wisdom holds that controlling undocumented migration is a 
legitimate legal and policy goal. However, the over-inclusiveness of 
targeting people of “Hispanic appearance” renders the classification a 
weak tool for detecting undocumented immigrants. Because the current 
classification is so broad, race-based immigration enforcement injures all 
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents of Latin American ancestry 
by subjecting them to unwarranted stops and diminishing their 
membership status in the United States. It unfortunately is part of a long 
history of U.S. immigration enforcement focused on citizens of Mexico.84 
A. Law in Books 
The Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) provides that INS officers 
“shall have power without warrant . . . to interrogate any alien or person 
believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United 
States . . . .”85 The Fourth Amendment,86 which the Supreme Court has 
applied to Border Patrol searches and seizures of all persons in the United 
 
 
 82. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (upholding detention before trial of 
person shown to pose danger to community, although recognizing that “[i]n our society liberty is the 
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that state pretrial detention procedures violated Constitution). 
 83. For the argument that constitutional protections should apply to foreign citizens in the United 
States, see supra  text accompanying notes 76-79; infra  text accompanying notes 256-58. 
 84. See Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration 
Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615 (1981); see also  KITTY CALAVITA , INSIDE THE STATE: THE 
BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. (1992) (studying program designed to bring 
temporary Mexican labor to United States). See generally ALFREDO MIRANDÉ, GRINGO JUSTICE 
(1987) (documenting long history of Border Patrol abuse of persons of Mexican ancestry); MARK 
REISLER, BY THE SWEAT OF T HEIR BROW: MEXICAN IMMIGRANT LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1900-1940 (1976) (analyzing history of regulation of Mexican immigrant labor in United States in first 
half of twentieth century). 
 85. INA § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). 
 86. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
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States, circumscribes this power.87 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,88 the Supreme Court applied the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard used in police 
investigatory stops89 and held that Border Patrol officers on roving patrols 
may stop persons “only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, 
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant 
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the 
country.”90 In so doing, the Court found that the stop in question violated 
the Fourth Amendment because Border Patrol officers relied exclusively 
on “the apparent Mexican ancestry” of the occupants in the automobile.91 
The Court further stated, however, that “[t]he likelihood that any given 
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican 
appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify 
stopping all Mexican Americans to ask if they are aliens.”92 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (holding that Border Patrol officer 
conducting search violated the Fourth Amendment). In one much-publicized case, a district court 
initially held, only to reverse itself later after a public outcry, that undocumented immigrants lacked 
standing to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds. See United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. 
Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d without opinion, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Victor C. 
Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On Guitterez and the 
Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (2000) (analyzing Guitterez 
decision); Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent 
Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 MO. L. REV. 213 (1991) (analyzing Fourth 
Amendment rights of aliens). 
 88. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The following analysis focuses on enforcement operations away from 
ports of entry into the country. Government has significantly greater leeway with respect to searches 
and seizures at the border than in the country’s interior. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive 
plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a 
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into 
this country.”) (citations omitted).  
 Evidence supports the claim that race influences immigration and customs inspections at ports of 
entry, as well as in the interior. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: 
BETTER T ARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER 
RESULTS 2 (2000) (summarizing results of study showing that black women citizens “were 9 times 
more likely than White women . . . to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down” even though they 
“were less than half as likely to be found carrying contraband as White women who were U.S. 
citizens”). See also  United States v. Ojebode, 957 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that border 
searches based on ethnicity are constitutional). 
 89. See supra  text accompanying notes 50-52 (discussing law requiring reasonable suspicion for 
investigatory stop). 
 90. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. 
 91. Id. at 885-86. 
 92. Id. at 886-87 (emphasis added). Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion for the Court, also 
authored the famous opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
emphasizing that in the pursuit of a diverse student body, race could be one factor in a university’s 
admissions criteria. See also  supra  note 17 and accompanying text (acknowledging possible 
distinctions between consideration of race in race profiling and affirmative action). 
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The last sentence from Brignoni-Ponce has greatly shaped immigration 
enforcement in the United States over the past twenty-five years. Yet 
consider how the same sentence from Brignoni-Ponce would read as 
applied to African Americans in the criminal law enforcement context. 
Could we imagine the Supreme Court stating that “[t]he likelihood that 
any given person of [African American] ancestry is [a criminal] is high 
enough to make [African American] appearance a relevant factor” in a 
criminal stop? Such a clearly discriminatory statement would provoke 
justified outrage. Nevertheless, the use of race in immigration stops to this 
point has not been carefully scrutinized.93 
In an important deviation from ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
the Court in Brignoni-Ponce authorized the Border Patrol to rely on 
“Mexican appearance” even if no individual, much less one who “appears 
Mexican,” has been specifically identified as having violated the 
immigration laws.94 To support its decision, the Court noted that the 
government “estimated that 85% of the aliens illegally in the country are 
from Mexico.”95 The Court’s authorization of Border Patrol consideration 
 
 
 93. For analysis of why race-based immigration enforcement has been virtually ignored, see infra 
Part IV and text accompanying note 237. The prevailing stereotypes of Latinos as “foreigners,” which 
ties into U.S. national identity, minimizes the likelihood of a public outcry about abuses in 
immigration law enforcement, such as that generated by race profiling of African Americans in 
criminal law enforcement. See infra  Parts IV.A.1, IV.B.  
 94. For discussion of cases holding that African American appearance may be considered in 
criminal law enforcement when the victim identifies the perpetrator as black, see supra  text 
accompanying notes 60-61. One commentator suggests that Brignoni-Ponce is consistent with the 
cases permitting consideration of race when the victim of a crime identifies the perpetrator as a racial 
minority. See Chin, supra  note 79, at 280. The Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce, however, found race 
relevant based on raw statistical probability, not because any specific individual had been accused of 
committing a specific crime. See supra  text accompanying notes 88-92; see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 239 (1983) (recognizing this fact). 
 95. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879 (footnote omitted). This estimate almost certainly was 
inaccurate when the Court made the assertion in 1975. See infra Part III.C.1. To support this 
proposition, the Court cited United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973), which 
relied on a 1974 Justice Department report, and bootstrapped its reasoning by stating that a high 
proportion of the deportable aliens came from Mexico. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879 n.5. See 
also  infra  text accompanying notes 198-200. Border Patrol consideration of “Hispanic appearance” in 
stopping persons inevitably contributes to the fact that roughly ninety percent of persons removed 
from U.S. are Latin American. See infra  text accompanying notes 198-200.  
 In authorizing great leeway to the INS, Supreme Court Justices have frequently invoked the strong 
governmental interest at stake in controlling undocumented immigration from Mexico and often have 
emphasized the difficulty of enforcement of the southern border. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1984) (rejecting general use of exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings and 
recognizing “the staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts”); INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 221–24 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing magnitude of 
“immigration problem” as justifying finding that INS sweep of factory did not constitute a “seizure” of 
persons under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 n.5 
(1982) (stating that undocumented immigration from Mexico is a “colossal problem”); Plyler v. Doe, 
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of “Mexican appearance” in Brignoni-Ponce conflicts with its recognition 
that “[l]arge numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the 
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the 
border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens.”96 The Court 
thus acknowledged, but failed to register concern with, the over-
inclusiveness of the Border Patrol’s racial classification.97 It failed to 
afford sufficient weight to the acknowledged fact that a relatively small 
percentage of the Mexican ancestry population in the United States is 
undocumented.98 Even assuming that statistical probabilities could justify 
the stop of persons of “Mexican appearance,” the allegedly high 
percentage of undocumented Mexicans in the total undocumented 
population that the Court relied on does not comport with the best 
estimates currently available.99  
In addition, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce appeared to be swayed by the 
government’s claimed need for flexibility in border enforcement because 
undocumented immigrants allegedly impose great social, economic, and 
other costs on U.S. society.100 Despite the Court’s unqualified 
pronouncement that undocumented aliens incur great societal costs, the 
question whether the costs of undocumented immigration outweigh its 
benefits remains hotly disputed in the academic literature.101 Prominent 
research studies suggest that the benefits outweigh the costs.102  
 
 
457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that undocumented immigration from 
Mexico was “virtually uncontrollable”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (observing 
that immigration enforcement poses “enormous difficulties”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 
899 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern that INS “is powerless to stop 
the tide of illegal aliens—and dangerous drugs—that daily and freely crosses” the border with 
Mexico). 
 96. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886 (footnote omitted). In making this statement, the Court cited 
demographic data from the 1970 Census showing that many citizens of Mexican ancestry lived in 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. See id. at 886 n.12. Due to the great increase of Latinos 
in these states since 1970, the Court’s argument that the class of persons of “Mexican appearance” 
includes a great many persons lawfully in the country is even more true today than it was then. See 
infra  Part III.C.1. 
 97. See infra  Part III.C.1. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79. 
 101. See Schuck, supra  note 20, at 1978-90 (summarizing studies on impacts of immigration on 
United States and concluding that they are inconclusive about the relative costs and benefits of 
immigration). 
 102. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, T HE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, 
AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). See also 
Michael A. Olivas, Immigration Law Teaching and Scholarship in the Ivory Tower: A Response to 
Race Matters, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 613, 632-35 (reviewing various studies on the economic costs and 
benefits of immigration). 
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Building on Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court subsequently afforded 
even greater leeway to Border Patrol officers who stop drivers at 
permanent checkpoints located many miles from the international border 
with Mexico. Classifying the intrusion as “sufficiently minimal,” the Court 
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte held that referrals to secondary 
inspection at permanent checkpoints “made largely on the basis of 
apparent Mexican ancestry” do not run afoul of the Constitution.103 The 
Court emphasized the Border Patrol’s need for flexibility104 and, as it did 
in Brignoni-Ponce,105 repeated the government’s assertion that eighty-five 
percent of the undocumented population in the United States is of Mexican 
origin.106 Martinez-Fuerte effectively permits a racist Border Patrol officer 
to stop all persons of Mexican ancestry.107 
B. Law in Action 
Current INS practice differs little from those facts before the Court in 
Brignoni-Ponce.108 By emphasizing that race may properly contribute to 
the decision to stop a person, the Court opened the door for relying on race 
combined with little more than a Border Patrol officer’s hunch.109 Concern 
for racial discrimination in immigration law enforcement practices is 
heightened by the fact that “Border Patrol officers may use racial 
 
 
 103. 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). See also  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, No. 99-1030, 2000 U.S. 
LEXIS 8084, at **11-13 (Nov. 28, 2000) (discussing Martinez-Fuerte as a border enforcement case 
with minimally intrusive procedure); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to fixed-sobriety checkpoint scheme). 
 104. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563-64. See also  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 
(1987) (citing Brignoni-Ponce for proposition that minimally intrusive seizure can be justified on less 
than probable cause to combat transportation of undocumented immigrants); Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 708 (1981) (Stewart , J., dissenting) (stating that Martinez-Fuerte upheld “brief stops and 
inquiries at permanent checkpoints [because of] the unique difficulty of patrolling” the U.S.-Mexico 
border). 
 105. See supra  text accompanying note 95. 
 106. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551. 
 107. See KENNEDY, supra  note 28, at 151. In his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan 
observed that the case authorized the Border Patrol to “target motorists of Mexican appearance. The 
process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens 
lawfully in this country for no other reason than that they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ 
physical and grooming characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 108. For analysis of cases scrutinizing use of race by Border Patrol, see infra  Part III.B.1. State 
courts have looked to Brignoni-Ponce in criminal cases with mixed results. Compare Arizona v. 
Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 927 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1996) (holding that Border Patrol officer relied excessively 
on race in stopping person), with Missouri v. Villa-Perez, 835 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1992) (upholding stop 
based in part on race). 
 109. See Maclin, supra  note 32, at 366 (“Although Brignoni-Ponce invalidated the specific seizure 
at issue, much in the Court’s opinion weakened Fourth Amendment protections.”). 
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stereotypes as a proxy for illegal conduct without being subjectively aware 
of doing so.”110 Unconscious reliance on stereotypes, combined with 
express consideration of “Mexican appearance,” greatly increases the 
potential for abuse. 
One important change since Brignoni-Ponce is that Border Patrol 
officers have expanded the Court’s endorsement of the use of “Mexican 
appearance” to the broader category of “Hispanic appearance,”111 to 
accommodate the significant increase in Central American immigration to 
the United States through Mexico that began in the 1980s.112 
1. On the Roads 
The INS admittedly employs crude undocumented immigrant profiles 
with race as the touchstone. Border Patrol officers expressly rely on a 
person’s “Hispanic appearance” as one factor in making immigration 
stops.113 For example, the New York Times reported that two Mexican 
American judges were stopped and questioned by the Border Patrol in 
south Texas.114 Border Patrol agents once pulled over the conservative 
 
 
 110. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Lawrence, supra note 
56). See United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 248 n.7 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gonzalez-
Rivera). 
 111. See infra  Part III.B.1. 
 112. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding permanent 
injunction barring Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) from engaging in pattern and practice 
of encouraging asylum-seekers from El Salvador to forego their claims and accept return to their 
native country); Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (approving 
settlement of class action in which Central American asylum-seekers accused U.S. government of 
discriminating against them in processing asylum claims); SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING 
MOVES:  SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS’  STRUGGLE FOR U.S. RESIDENCY  (2000) (documenting 
Salvadoran immigrants’ efforts to regularize their immigration status in United States). The 
classification of Mexican and Central American nationals as being of “Hispanic appearance” is 
consistent with the prevailing stereotype of Latinos as a homogeneous group when, in fact, they are 
diverse in many different respects, including physical appearance. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 129-
38. For a discussion of the range of physical appearances among Latinos in United States, see infra 
text accompanying notes 211-15.  
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Hernandez, 62 F.3d 1353, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Franco-Munoz, 952 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Magana, 797 
F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pulido-Santoyo, 580 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1978). See 
also  United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that 
“Brignoni-Ponce explained that ‘Mexican appearance [is] a relevant factor’ when the stop occurs near 
the United States-Mexico border”) (citations omitted). 
 114. See Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless 
Hispanics, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at A17; see also  James Pinkerton, Border Patrol Twice Stops 
U.S. Judge on Way to Court, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 1, 2000, at 1 (reporting that federal judge, 
Filemon Vela, was stopped twice by Border Patrol, once for having “too many” passengers and once 
for having tinted windows); Leonel Sanchez, Latinos Protest Ethnic Profiling, SAN DIEGO UNION-
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law-and-order mayor of a California city, a third generation Mexican 
American driving a pick-up truck, to verify his citizenship status. The 
agents told him that he fit an undocumented immigrant “profile”; the 
mayor’s explanation cut to the core: “‘you get stopped if you are Mexican. 
Period.’”115  
Contending that the U.S. government regularly violates the wide 
latitude afforded it by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs in many lawsuits 
allege that the Border Patrol relies almost exclusively on race in making 
immigration stops.116 In one case in which the plaintiffs alleged that the 
INS engaged in a pattern and practice of exclusively race-based stops, INS 
officials testified that an officer might properly rely, along with Hispanic 
appearance, on a “hungry look” and the fact that a person was “dirty, 
unkempt,” or “wears work clothing.”117 In other cases, the INS defense 
effectively amounts to the claim that because most alleged “illegal aliens” 
are Hispanic, statistical probabilities justify the stop.118  
In 1992, citizens of “Hispanic descent,” including the students, 
graduates, faculty, and staff of a high school in El Paso, Texas, claimed 
that Border Patrol officers engaged in a pattern and practice of 
interrogating Mexican American citizens about their immigration status 
 
 
T RIB., July 24, 2000, at A1 (reporting incident in which Border Patrol officer told Latina lawyer that 
she was stopped over because “‘You look Mexican . . . .’”). 
 115. Lee Romney, Over the Line?: Citing Questioning of Mayor, Activists Say Border Patrol 
Targets All Latinos, L.A. T IMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at J1. See David Jackson & Paul de la Garza, Rep. 
Gutierrez Uncommon Target of a Too Common Slur, CHI. T RIB., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1 (reporting that 
police officer in Capitol told Luis Gutierrez, a member of Congress of Puerto Rican descent, “‘[w]hy 
don’t you and your people just go back to the country you came from?’”). 
 116. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Nicacio v. 
INS, 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 796 
F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 117. Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1985). Courts encounter great difficulty in 
reviewing the lawfulness of a stop based on such subjective factors, and therefore tend to defer to the 
Border Patrol on the assumption that “officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons 
who live in Mexico.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (citation omitted). Deference, of course, is the 
touchstone of modern administrative law. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990). The courts have been particularly deferential to the Executive 
Branch in immigration matters. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-33 (1999); Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 
483-84 (1992). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain 
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993) (analyzing 
judicial deference to immigration decisions of Executive Branch). No theory of deference to an 
administrative agency, however, can justify the consideration of invidious factors such as race in the 
treatment of noncitizens in the United States. See infra  text accompanying notes 238-61. 
 118. See United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rubio-
Hernandez, 39 F. Supp. 2d 808, 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
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and further claimed that officers on occasion physically assaulted those 
who asserted their legal rights.119 Similarly, in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la 
Vina,120 Arizona motorists of Latino descent accused the INS of stopping 
them without the reasonable suspicion required by law. Although courts 
occasionally find that stops fail to satisfy the Supreme Court’s minimal 
Fourth Amendment requirements,121 race-based discriminatory 
enforcement generally continues unabated, unreported, and unremedied. 
As this discussion reveals, the Border Patrol’s undocumented 
immigrant profile contains class-based as well as race-based elements.122 
Generally speaking, immigration laws have historically limited admission 
of poor and working people into the United States and continue to do so.123 
 
 
 119. See Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 492-94 (W.D. Tex. 1992). After a court 
enjoined such conduct, the parties settled the lawsuit. See ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, NEW MEXICO, AND 
T EXAS ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL 
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST:  CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACTS ON BORDER 
COMMUNITY 15-20 (1997). 
 120. 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (affirming dismissal on justicability grounds). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 247-48 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 
299, 302 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 122. See Magana, 797 F.2d at 781 (stating that Border Patrol officers, among other factors, 
observed that automobile passengers “appeared to be farm workers, one of whom wore a hat which the 
officers emphasized was indicative of someone who came from the Mexican state of Jalisco”); United 
States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1228 (5th Cir. 1984) (Tate, J., dissenting) (contending “that, stripped 
to its essence, the stop was based upon no more than the border patrolmen’s speculation that poor and 
dirty Hispanic appearing persons might possibly be Mexican aliens”); United States v. Hernandez-
Lopez, 538 F.2d 284, 285-86 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that Border Patrol officers observed that person 
stopped “did not look like he had lived in the United States, but rather looked like a ‘Mexican 
cowboy’”) (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v. Ramon, 86 F. Supp. 2d 665 (W.D. Tex. 2000) 
(holding that Border Patrol reliance on display of religious symbols on automobile could not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion justifying a stop). Class also influences ordinary criminal law enforcement. See 
Harris, supra  note 31 (discussing how appearing “poor” as well as black enhances the likelihood of 
being subject to Terry stop). 
 123. See Johnson, supra  note 24, at 1519-28 (summarizing this history). See also  infra  text 
accompanying notes 290-91 (discussing impacts of “public charge” exclusion under immigration 
laws). In deciding whether to grant visa applications, for example, State Department consular officers 
rely on race and class profiles. See T .  ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP : PROCESS AND POLICY  462 (4th ed. 1998) (describing case in which former consular 
officer claimed that he was terminated for not following racial and class stereotypes called for by 
office policy); Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) (same). Congress in 1996 amended 
the immigration laws in a way that arguably permitted greater consideration of race and nationality in 
visa decisions. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) § 633, 8 
U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1994) (adding the following sentence to nondiscrimination 
requirement: “Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of 
State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations 
where such applications will be processed”). See also  William L. Pham, Comment, Section 633 of 
IIRIRA: Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa Processing, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (1998) 
(analyzing discriminatory potential of the amendment). Notably, consular visa decisions are wholly 
immune from judicial review. See, e.g., Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 
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In addition, race and class have been central to the historical subordination 
of persons of Mexican ancestry in the United States.124 Currently, persons 
of Mexican ancestry as well as those who fit the “Hispanic appearance” 
stereotype, particularly working class and poor people, commonly find 
themselves subject to immigration enforcement procedures more than 
other persons in the United States.125 
Contrary to popular belief, race-based immigration enforcement 
extends far from the U.S. borders and into every region of the United 
States.126 Heightened immigration enforcement and civil rights complaints 
in the South and Pacific Northwest accompanied increased Mexican and 
Central American migration to those regions.127 Latinos have long leveled 
legal challenges at alleged immigration enforcement excesses in the 
Midwest,128 which corresponds with the history of Mexican migration to 
the region.129 In 1997, for example, a district court enjoined Ohio law 
 
 
Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976). 
 124. For an analysis of the interaction of race and class in the subordination of Chicanos in the 
United States of recent class in the subordination of Chicanos in the United States, see RODOLFO 
ACUÑA , OCCUPIED AMERICA : A HISTORY OF CHICANOS (4th ed. 1999); TOMÁS ALMAGUER, RACIAL 
FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994); MARIO 
BARRERA ,  RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST (1979); NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: 
MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES IN T EXAS COTTON CULTURE (1997); DAVID MONTEJANO, 
ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF T EXAS, 1836-1936 (1987). 
 125. See supra  notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
 126. See United States v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 582 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting authority 
concluding that INS officers may consider Brignoni-Ponce factors in immigration stop in areas well 
beyond the border region).  
 127. See, e.g., Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 
(9th Cir. 1985), modified, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986); Cervantes-Cuevas v. INS, 797 F.2d 707 (9th 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 496 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also Deborah 
M. Weissman, Between Principles and Practice: The Need for Certified Court Reporters in North 
Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1899, 1907-22 (2000) (describing increase in Latino population in North 
Carolina and state’s reaction to various changes); Sue Anne Pressley, Hispanic Immigration Boom 
Rattles South , WASH . POST, Mar. 6, 2000, at A3 (reporting on increasing immigration from Mexico to 
the South and great increase in Hispanic population in southern states from 1990-98).  
 128. See, e.g., Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming issuance of 
injunction in case where complaint alleged INS pattern and practice of harassment of persons of 
Mexican ancestry, including director and deputy director of Illinois Migrant Council), modified, 548 
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Ramirez v. Webb, 787 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 
(affirming grant of preliminary injunction in case brought by class of persons of “Hispanic origin or 
appearance” within the Western District of Michigan subject to unlawful stops by INS). A 1999 
enforcement operation, known as “Operation Vanguard,” in Nebraska provoked criticism from 
Mexican American and immigrant organizations. See David LaGesse, Social Security Officials Halt 
INS Program in Meatpacking Industry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 1999, at 5A; Mike Sherry, 
Panel to Review INS Initiative Operation Vanguard Advisory Panel, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 
10, 1999, at 23. 
 129. See, e.g., DENNIS NODÍN VALDÉS,  BARRIOS NORTEÑOS: ST. PAUL AND MIDWESTERN 
MEXICAN COMMUNITIES IN THE T WENTIETH CENTURY  (2000); DENNIS NODÍN VALDÉS, AL NORTE: 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1917-1970 (1991). 
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enforcement officers from stopping and detaining Hispanic motorists 
based on race or national origin and interrogating them about their 
immigration status.130 Ohio law enforcement officers admitted that the vast 
majority of the motorists asked for immigration documentation were 
Hispanic and that officers asked for a green card if a driver spoke little, or 
poor, English. One officer testified that “he became suspicious that a 
motorist was an illegal alien if the motorist was going to pick crops, was 
coming from Florida or Texas, had little money, was driving an older 
vehicle, and/or was wearing work clothes.”131 
As the Ohio case reveals, state and local governments, sometimes with 
federal encouragement, have engaged in egregious race-based immigration 
enforcement.132 During and after the violence in May 1992 following 
acquittal of white police officers charged with the brutal beating of 
Rodney King, an African American man, in Los Angeles,133 local law 
enforcement officers with the cooperation of the INS engaged in a 
concerted effort to arrest and deport undocumented Latino immigrants.134 
In July 1997, police in Chandler, a suburb of Phoenix, Arizona, with the 
cooperation of the Border Patrol began an operation in the name of 
community redevelopment and stopped cars with drivers or passengers of 
“Mexican appearance” to check their immigration status.135 At stores 
 
 
 130. See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 991 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Ohio 
1997). 
 131. Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 
2000). For discussing of Border Patrol’s reliance on indicia of class in undocumented immigrant 
profiles, see supra  text accompanying notes 122-25. 
 132. See Anne-Marie O’Connor, Rampart Set Up Latinos to Be Deported, INS Says, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Los Angeles Police Department gang task force indiscriminately 
rounded up Latinos and turned over those with questionable immigration status to the INS); see also 
UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , ILLEGAL ALIENS: INS PARTICIPATION IN ANTIGANG 
T ASK FORCES IN LOS ANGELES (Oct. 2000) (reporting on INS cooperation with Los Angeles Police 
Department). See generally FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF 
BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (1995) (analyzing efforts of state and local 
governments to send persons of Mexican ancestry to Mexico). Recent changes to the immigration laws 
have increased the role of state and local governments in the enforcement of the federal immigration 
laws. See Jay T. Jorgensen, Comment, The Practical Power of State and Local Governments to 
Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899. 
 133. See supra  note 29 (citing authorities analyzing King incident). 
 134. See MANUEL PASTOR,  JR. ET AL., LATINOS AND THE LOS ANGELES UPRISING: THE 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT 11-13 (1993). See also  Cruz Reynoso, Hispanics and the Criminal Justice 
System , in HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES 277, 284-85 (Pastora San Juan Cafferty & David W. 
Engstrom eds., 2000) (analyzing cooperation between law enforcement and INS). 
 135. See Kathy Khoury, Who Gets Swept in Immigration Sweep?, CHR. SCI. MON., Feb. 2, 1999, 
at 1; Hector Tobar, An Ugly Stain on a City’s Bright and Shining Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at 
A1. See also  Michael A. Fletcher, Latinos See Bias in Elgin’s Fight Against Blight, WASH. POST, May 
29, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Latinos in Chicago suburb contend that housing regulat ions are being 
enforced in discriminatory manner). 
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frequented by undocumented persons, police officers questioned patrons 
about their immigration status. Police officers also entered homes of 
suspected undocumented immigrants without warrants or probable cause 
and stopped “[n]umerous American citizens and legal residents . . . on 
multiple occasions . . . for no other reason than their skin color or Mexican 
appearance or use of the Spanish language.”136 
That claims of discriminatory enforcement of immigration laws 
continue should not be surprising.137 By granting vast discretion to the 
Border Patrol, the Supreme Court invites race to dominate immigration 
enforcement. A ground level study of immigration enforcement concludes 
that Border Patrol “[o]fficers can easily strengthen their reasonable 
suspicion for an interrogation after they have begun talking to an 
individual . . . . It is easy to come up with the necessary articulable facts 
after the fact . . . . [This practice] is referred to as ‘canned p.c.’ (probable 
cause).”138 Moreover, officers may believe that they can identify an 
undocumented person to a near certainty when, in fact, they err more often 
than not.139 This formula is tailor-made for a pattern of stops based 
exclusively on “Hispanic appearance,” with the officers concocting a 
legally-defensible rationale after the fact.140 
 
 
 136. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, RESULTS OF THE CHANDLER SURVEY 31 
(1997). The INS Office of Internal Audit criticized the Border Patrol’s role in the operation. See 
Memorandum from Office of Executive Associate Commissioner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, I.N.S., to the 
Commissioner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, I.N.S. (statement on the I.N.S. Chandler Report) (on file with the 
author) (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 137. Courts generally have found it difficult to ensure compliance with the law by the federal 
immigration agencies. See Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: 
Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115 (1992) (finding 
from an empirical study that courts reversed decisions of immigration agencies at high rates, thereby 
suggesting structural flaws in immigration bureaucracy). 
 138. Edwin Harwood, Arrests Without Warrant: The Legal and Organizational Environment of 
Immigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 531 (1984) (emphasis added). See EDWIN 
HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY’S SHADOW 59 (1986) (“INS officers can easily circumvent the constitutional 
requirements. To justify a stop, officers can easily claim that they thought the individual was wearing 
Mexican clothing, behaved furtively, or closely resembled a person they had processed before.”); 
Developments in the Law—Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1374 
(1983) (stating that Supreme Court has “grant[ed] INS agents the freedom to select individuals for 
interrogation on the basis of ethnicity, as long as the agents can meet the minimal burden of devising 
plausible post hoc rationalizations for their actions”) (footnote omitted). Cf. Montero-Camargo, 208 
F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating that Border Patrol officers alleged reasoning for a stop 
of Latino driver was “window dressing, designed to get around” Ninth Circuit precedent). 
 139. See Harwood, supra  note 138, at 532 n.105 (noting that officer he observed believed that he 
correctly identified undocumented persons over ninety percent of time and that he had a “‘sixth sense’ 
for distinguishing an illegal alien” when officer’s accuracy in fact was in the 20-25% range). 
 140. One federal judge went so far as to contend that the law has evolved to a point where the 
courts have in effect created an exception to the Fourth Amendment for the Border Patrol. See United 
States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[H]istory is likely 
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2. In the Workplace 
The Supreme Court’s authorization of the use of race in Brignoni-
Ponce has influenced immigration enforcement in the workplace as well as 
on the roads. No doubt encouraged by the Court’s reasoning, the INS 
relies on “Hispanic appearance” in selecting workplaces to search for 
undocumented workers.141 During workplace raids, which the Supreme 
Court refused to classify as “seizures” subject to the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment,142 the INS has targeted persons of apparent Latin 
American ancestry for interrogation.143 Critics object to worksite raids, 
although the role of race in the sweeps has not been challenged as strongly 
as one might expect.144 Due to the criticism, particularly the objections of 
employers, the INS in recent years has focused on border enforcement 
 
 
to judge the judiciary’s evisceration of the Fourth Amendment in the vicinity of the Mexican border as 
yet another jurisprudential nadir, joining Korematsu [ v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)], Dred 
Scott [ v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)], and even Plessy [ v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)] on the 
list of our most shameful failures to discharge our duty of defending constitutional civil liberties 
against the popular hue and cry that would have us abridge them.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 141. See, e.g., Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432, 442 (N.D. Cal. 
1989) (recounting testimony of INS agents that “when questioned as to the justification for entering [a 
workplace] without a warrant, [the agents] answered that they did not need one ‘if they could see 
Mexicans in plain view of the street’”) (footnote omitted); Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. 
Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that INS acknowledged that it considered 
“‘apparent Latin decent’ [sic]” of workers in deciding to raid factory), rev’d sub nom, INS v. Delgado, 
466 U.S. 210 (1984); Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1226 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (condoning INS consideration of “‘foreign appearances’” of employees in deciding to embark 
on enforcement operation). As with other aspects of immigration enforcement, race profiling in 
workplace enforcement tends to have class-specific impacts. See supra text accompanying notes 122-
25; see also infra  text accompanying notes 311-13.  
 142. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). For criticism of the Court’s reasoning in Delgado, 
see Note, Reexamining the Constitutionality of the INS Workplace Raids After the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1979 (1987). 
 143. See Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 674 F. Supp. 294, 295 
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing legal challenges to INS raids and stating that plaintiffs “allege[d] that in a 
typical raid, the INS would block the exits from the work area and systematically question primarily 
hispanic [sic] workers about their immigration status”). 
 144. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 973-76, 987-98 (reviewing 
litigation surrounding INS workplace enforcement and the various objections to INS raids); NATIONAL 
INS RAIDS T ASK FORCE , PORTRAIT OF INJUSTICE : THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON FAMILIES, 
WORKERS, AND COMMUNITIES (1998) (documenting negative consequences of INS raids); INS 
Distributes New Guidelines for Worksite Raids, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 979 (July 17, 1998) 
(announcing new INS procedures in response to “a raid . . . in Miami where armed INS agents stormed 
into a warehouse, and allegedly were abusive to the workers. One woman reported that an agent 
grabbed her by the hair, threw her on the floor and kicked her. A pregnant woman reportedly fainted 
after being shoved.”) (footnotes omitted). See also  Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or By Crook: Exploring 
the Legality of an INS Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 813 (1994) (examining operation in 
which INS lured deportable aliens to report to INS for arrest by false promises of amnesty). 
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rather than workplace raids in the country’s interior.145 
Race-based workplace enforcement conflicts with the 
nondiscrimination rules that the immigration laws impose on employers. 
In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)146 as part of a 
compromise that allowed for the imposition of sanctions on employers of 
undocumented immigrants,147 Congress prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of national origin or immigration status by employers against 
immigrants authorized to work.148 If employers relied on race in their 
hiring practices in the same way that the INS does in immigration stops 
and workplace raids, they would necessarily violate IRCA’s 
nondiscrimination provisions.149 In any event, discrimination against 
national origin minorities does not appear to be a high priority. Despite 
findings of a pattern and practice of discrimination by employers in 
violation of the law, Congress has not toughened the anti-discrimination 
provisions. Indeed, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) increased the difficulty of establishing a 
discrimination claim by requiring proof of a “purpose” or “intent of 
 
 
 145. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, INS to Cut Workplace Raids, Target Employers, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 1999, at A1. 
 146. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. 
 147. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 963-64 (2d ed. 
1997). For an analysis of the complex politics culminating in the passage of the Act, see Peter H. 
Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s, 6 AM. POL. DEV. 37 
(1992). 
 148. See INA § 274B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a). 
 149. Strong evidence exists that employers discriminate against Latino, Asian Americans, and 
other perceived “foreigners” living lawfully in the country. As stated by the Commission on 
Immigration Reform, IRCA’s anti-discrimination provisions have largely failed, as demonstrated by 
“the documentation of government and private studies of discriminatory practices against foreign-
sounding and foreign-looking applicants for employment.” U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY : RESTORING CREDIBILITY  52 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY]. See U.S. GEN.  ACCOUNTING OFFICE , 
IMMIGRATION REFORM—EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 3-8 (1990); 
Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  343, 347-48, 364-69, 381-83 (1994). See also Michael A. Scaperlanda, 
The Paradox of a Title: Discrimination Within the Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1043 (examining anti-discrimination provisions 
of Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). The Commission stated that: 
[T]he pattern of subjecting foreign-appearing workers to different or additional requirements 
appears most prevalent: employers selectively verify employment authorization for some, but 
not other, employees, refusing to accept valid documents, requiring specific documents from 
certain workers (such as a green card from everyone they believe to be an immigrant), and 
accepting only a limited number of documents, such as a driver’s license and social security 
card. 
U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY , supra , at 80. 
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discriminating against an individual.”150  
Race profiling in immigration enforcement facilitates the exploitation 
of undocumented Latin Americans by their employers.151 Playing on fears 
of apprehension due to race-based immigration enforcement in the 
workplace and on the roads, employers have considerable leverage in 
dealing with undocumented workers.152 Employers remain confident that 
the undocumented workers, psychologically conditioned that their 
appearance automatically places their immigration status into question, 
will be unlikely to report workplace violations to the authorities due to 
their fear of removal from the country.153 
3. The Lack of Effective Remedies 
No existing device effectively deters excessive reliance on race by the 
INS in the enforcement of immigration laws. Legal challenges to 
misconduct, such as class actions, run into formidable procedural154 and 
 
 
 150. IIRIRA § 421 (amending INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6)). See Maria Isabel 
Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 669, 693-95 (1997). 
 151. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY , supra note 149, at 
53 (“Because they have few avenues of redress if their rights to fair wages and working conditions are 
denied, illegal aliens are particularly vulnerable to abuse.”). A wealth of literature exists on how a 
person’s uncertain immigration status facilitates their exploitation. See, e.g., Gerald P. López, The 
Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN L. REV. 1 (1989) (describing struggle of undocumented 
Mexican immigrant struggling at low wage job); Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: 
Undocumented Workers’ Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
607, 617-23 (1994) (discussing exploitation of undocumented women in the workplace). 
 152. An extreme example is the immigrant garment workers who were held in involuntary 
servitude in an apartment complex in southern California, which the authorities uncovered in 1995. 
See Laura Ho, Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp, (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the 
Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 
383-84 (1996). 
 153. See Bosniak, supra  note 144, at 986-87. See also  Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing split in circuits over whether undocumented 
workers may obtain reinstatement and backpay as remedy for employer’s violation of National Labor 
Relations Act); Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that undocumented Latina could 
be removed from the country even though tip by her employer to INS resulting in her apprehension 
violated federal labor law); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy 
of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform , 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) 
(analyzing Montero  decision). 
 154. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (dismissing 
action claiming pattern and practice of INS discrimination against Latino motorists on justicability 
grounds). See also  Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1454-55 (1997) (stating that Congress 
amended INA § 242(f) in 1996 “to prevent class-wide injunctions” against INS); Leti Volpp, Court-
Stripping and Class-Wide Relief: A Response to Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  463 (2000) (analyzing negative impacts of 1996 amendments to immigration laws 
limiting injunctive relief available in class actions that challenge INS patterns and practices). Cf. 
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substantive155 barriers. Commentators routinely criticize internal INS 
complaint procedures as ineffective.156 The Supreme Court has held that 
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule generally does not cover civil 
removal proceedings, so that the fruits of an unlawful stop ordinarily 
remain admissible.157 Although the Court emphasized that it was not 
dealing “with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties 
that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the 
probative value of the evidence obtained,”158 establishing such extreme 
conduct to invoke the exclusionary rule has proven difficult.159 Because 
race is a legally proper factor to consider in an immigration stop, 
establishing that race was the exclusive factor for the stop, which the law 
currently requires, is far from easy.160 
In 1985, one observer summarized the status of border enforcement in 
words that continue to ring true today: 
 
 
Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM 
L. REV. 1815 (2000) (discussing justiciability barriers to race profiling claims due to decision in City 
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1993)). 
 155. See infra  text accompanying notes 248-55 (discussing difficulties in proving Equal Protection 
violations). 
 156. See Bill Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures Available to 
Victims, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  757 (1995); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A 
Case for Civilian Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1994); Jesus A. TreviZo, Comment, 
Border Violence Against Illegal Immigrants and the Need to Change the Border Patrol’s Current 
Complaint Review Process, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 85 (1998). 
 157. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
analogized undocumented persons to hazardous waste. See id. at 1046 (“Presumably no one would 
argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective 
action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been improperly 
obtained . . . .”) (emphasis added). See also  Peter L. Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the Alien 
Benefits Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1577 (1995) (analyzing use of environmental metaphors in 
immigration debate, specifically immigrant receipt of public benefits). 
 For arguments on why certain criminal procedure protections, such as the exclusionary rule, 
should apply to removal proceedings, see Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: 
Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 305 (2000). See also  Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000) (calling for 
constitutional protections for noncitizens in removal proceedings because of their nature and impact). 
 158. Lopez-Mendoza , 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (citation omitted). But see Montero, 124 F.3d at 386 
(refusing to exclude evidence from removal proceeding obtained in violation of the First Amendment). 
 159. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
Border Patrol’s conduct in making a race-based stop was “egregious,” thereby justifying application of 
the exclusionary rule); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a person’s 
possession of a “Nigerian-sounding name,” which the court reasoned might serve as a proxy for race, 
was insufficient to justify an INS stop). But see Matter of Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980) 
(concluding that INS stopped alien exclusively because of “Latin appearance” in violation of Fourth 
Amendment but refusing to bar evidence obtained as a result of stop from removal proceedings). 
 160. See supra  text accompanying notes 88-92. 
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[I]mmigration authorities can still effectively stop and interrogate 
anyone they meet . . . providing only that the [person] looks foreign. 
While they cannot in theory question people on the basis of racial or 
ethnic appearance alone, they in fact do so consistently, and no one 
familiar with the realities of immigration enforcement would 
suggest the contrary.161 
C. The Need for Change 
The deficiencies in the existing law authorizing the Border Patrol to 
consider race in immigration stops demand change. The “Hispanic 
appearance” classification is dramatically overbroad and unnecessarily 
includes many U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants.162 In addition to the 
weak correlation between the “Hispanic appearance” classification and 
undocumented status, the dignitary harms suffered by Latinos living 
lawfully in the United States call for legal reform.163 These shortcomings 
fail to differ significantly from those that have provoked the public outcry 
against race profiling in criminal law enforcement.164 
1. Over-Inclusiveness 
The stereotype that all Latinos are “foreigners” of suspicious 
immigration status influences immigration enforcement law.165 The facts, 
however, belie the stereotype and show that cases like Brignoni-Ponce and 
Martinez-Fuerte rest, at best, on shaky factual foundations. 
In vesting the Border Patrol with the discretion to consider “Mexican 
appearance” in immigration stops, the Supreme Court relied on the 
government’s assertion that eighty-five percent of the undocumented 
population in the United States was of Mexican ancestry.166 Assuming that 
it is relevant to the inquiry, this figure bears no resemblance to the best 
available evidence today and in all likelihood was inaccurate in 1975.167 In 
 
 
 161. ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 
100 (1985). 
 162. See infra  Part III.C.1. 
 163. See infra  Part III.C.2. 
 164. See supra  Part II. 
 165. See supra  text accompanying notes 88-153; see also infra  Part IV.  
 166. See supra  text accompanying notes 95, 106. 
 167. See Arthur F. Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 
1970-1981, 45 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 223, 246, 259 (1982) (reviewing various estimates of 
undocumented immigrants in United States and concluding that best estimate at time was that only 
fifty to sixty percent of undocumented population was of Mexican origin). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p675 Johnson.doc  4/26/01   4:43 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
708 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:675 
 
 
 
 
1981, the final report of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy summarizing U.S. Bureau of the Census data reported that 
“Mexican nationals probably account for less than half  of the 
undocumented/illegal population.”168 According to the latest INS 
estimates, Mexican citizens comprise roughly one-half of the 
undocumented population,169 a far cry from the unsubstantiated estimate 
that the government provided the Supreme Court in 1975.170 
In any event, rather than considering the percentage of undocumented 
persons of Mexican ancestry in the country, the Supreme Court should 
have considered the percentage of the total Hispanic population in the 
United States with lawful immigration statuses. This represents the group 
of individuals subject to the injuries inflicted by race profiling in 
immigration enforcement, harms never considered seriously by the Court 
in Brignoni-Ponce. The population of persons of “Hispanic appearance” 
residing lawfully in the United States and subject to race-based 
immigration stops is extensive, having grown substantially since 1975.171 
In 1997, nearly thirty million people of Hispanic ancestry—over eleven 
percent of the total U.S. population—lived in the United States,172 an 
 
 
 168. U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY , FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 169. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE  200 tbl.N (1999) [hereinafter 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. Some 
other estimates are considerably lower. See Frank Sharry, Myths, Realities and Solutions: Facts About 
Illegal Immigrants, 67 SPECTRUM: THE JOURNAL OF STATE GOVERNMENT 20 (1994) (contending that 
data shows that Mexican nationals comprise only thirty percent of undocumented immigrant 
population in United States). There is evidence that Mexicans as a percentage of the overall 
undocumented population declined after the implementation of the legalization program created by the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. See Karen A. 
Woodrow & Jeffrey S. Passel, Post-IRCA Undocumented Immigration to the United States: An 
Assessment Based on the June 1988 CPS, in UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: 
IRCA AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980S 48, 66-67 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990) 
 170. See supra  note 95 and accompanying text. This would not be the first time that erroneous 
data provided by the U.S. government resulted in the making of law adverse to immigrants. See 
LEGOMSKY, supra  note 147, at 148-49 (describing how INS Commissioner’s testimony before 
congressional committee presented erroneous estimates of marriage fraud that helped ensure passage 
of Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537, which 
imposed strict new requirements on persons seeking to have spouses obtain immigrant visas). 
 171. In declining to follow the Court’s 1975 statement in Brignoni-Ponce that  race could be 
considered as one factor in a stop, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized the fact that 
the Latino population had grown dramatically since the 1970s. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 
208 F.3d 1122, 1132-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). See also  United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 
1481, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994) (McKay, J., dissenting) (contending that “Hispanic appearance” should 
not factor into Border Patrol officer’s decision to stop person because Hispanics constitute nearly 40 
percent of the population of New Mexico). 
 172. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE ,  CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:  THE HISPANIC 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 1997 (UPDATE ) (1998). 
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increase from 14.6 million people or 6.5 percent of the population in 
1980.173 In contrast, as of October 1996, barely over three million 
undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants lived in the 
United States.174 A crude estimate from these figures reveals that the vast 
majority (about ninety percent) of Hispanics in the United States are 
lawful immigrants or citizens.175 
Much-publicized population projections also show a growing Hispanic 
population in this country. The Bureau of the Census estimates that by 
2050, Hispanics will constitute nearly twenty-five percent of the U.S. 
population.176 Each year, hundreds of thousands of persons of Latin 
American ancestry are lawfully admitted to this country. In fiscal year 
1997 alone, the United States admitted over 146,000 lawful permanent 
residents from Mexico.177 Over 640,000 in 1971-80, about 1.7 million in 
1981-90, and over 1.8 million Mexican immigrants in 1991-97, lawfully 
immigrated to the United States.178 In fiscal years 1988-97, nearly 600,000 
Mexican immigrants naturalized and became U.S. citizens.179 
In California, whose southern border is one of the focal points of U.S. 
immigration enforcement, Hispanics comprised over one-quarter of the 
state’s population in 1990.180 Hispanics constitute a large percentage, 
sometimes even a majority, of the population in many localities on or near 
California’s Mexican border.181 For example, in Imperial County, a hot 
bed of border enforcement in the state, Hispanics constitute over seventy 
 
 
 173. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE , STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 tbl.19 
(119th ed. 1999). 
 174. See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 200 tbl.N. 
 175. This rough estimate was computed by dividing the Bureau of the Census report projection 
that roughly thirty million Latinos live in the United States, by the INS estimate that about three 
million are undocumented. See supra  notes 171-74 and accompanying text. 
 176. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE , CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE , AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1995 TO 2050, at 13 tbl.J (1996). 
As at least one member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has observed that these 
demographics will likely make national origin discrimination a greater problem in the future. See 
Undocumented Workers, National Origin Discrimination Prove Tricky for Employers, 68 U.S.L.W. 
2611, 2612 (Apr. 18, 2000). 
 177. See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 21 tbl.C.  
 178. See id. at 26 tbl.2. 
 179. See id. at 148 tbl.47. 
 180. See JON STILES ET AL., CALIFORNIA LATINO DEMOGRAPHIC DATABOOK 2-5 tbl.2.1 (1998). 
 181. See id. at 2-32, 2-34 (Maps 2.22, 2.24); see also David G. Gutiérrez, Migration, Emergent 
Ethnicity, and the “Third Space”: The Shifting Politics of Nationalism in Greater Mexico, 86 J. AM. 
HIST. 481, 505-06 (1999) (“By 1990 . . . , ethnic Mexicans constituted more than 40 percent of the 
population of . . . Los Angeles . . . , nearly 30 percent of . . . Tucson, 52 percent of San Antonio’s 
population, 66 percent of El Paso’s, and nearly 78 percent of the sprawling Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito metropolitan area.”). 
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percent of the population.182 
Because of the dramatic growth of the Latino community, which is 
projected to continue for an indefinite future, both the number of persons 
subject to and the percentage of the total population potentially injured by 
race-based immigration stops have increased significantly since the 
Supreme Court’s 1975 Brignoni-Ponce decision.183 Given the millions of 
Latinos residing lawfully in the United States, “Hispanic appearance” 
holds little probative value in determining whether a person lacks proper 
immigration documentation. In Equal Protection terms, the classification 
is over-inclusive with respect to the ostensible goal of identifying 
undocumented persons. Like the proverbial “dragnet,” it punishes “the 
innocent bystander, the hapless victim of circumstance or association. . . . 
[S]uch classifications fly squarely in the face of our traditional antipathy to 
assertions of mass guilt and guilt by association.”184 As Tussman and 
tenBroek observed in their famous Equal Protection article, “Herod, 
ordering the death of all male children born on a particular day because 
one of them would some day bring about his downfall, employed [an 
overinclusive] classification[,]” as did the United States government in 
interning persons of Japanese ancestry on the west coast during World 
War II.185 Although the “Hispanic appearance” category is not as 
overbroad as these examples, its expansiveness should nevertheless 
trouble scholars committed to equality under the law. 
Endorsing the use of statistical probabilities in immigration 
enforcement, one commentator contends that Border Patrol officers 
properly consider race because of the “correlation between apparent 
Mexican ancestry and the law enforcement objective of” controlling 
undocumented immigration, and because “acknowledging its use and 
limited relevance may encourage an officer to acknowledge her reliance 
on racial factors.”186 Reliance on such racial correlations, however, is 
generally forbidden in domestic criminal law enforcement because of the 
resulting dignitary harms and injustices.187 Race profiling in immigration 
enforcement similarly injures persons of Latin American ancestry residing 
 
 
 182. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE , POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR COUNTIES BY RACE AND 
HISPANIC ORIGIN: JULY 1, 1999 (1999). 
 183. See supra  text accompanying notes 169-79. 
 184. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 351-52 (1949). 
 185. Id. at 351. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of a 
U.S. citizen of Japanese ancestry during World War II). 
 186. Thompson, supra  note 33, at 1007. 
 187. See supra  Part II.A. 
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lawfully in the United States.188 In addition, as the cases reveal, Border 
Patrol officers readily admit the use of race as a factor in immigration 
stops; encouraging the acknowledgement of such reliance serves no 
legitimate purpose.189  
Whatever the raw probabilities might suggest, race profiling in 
immigration enforcement may not even make sense from a utilitarian 
perspective. Current U.S. border enforcement policy often professes to be 
directed toward apprehending commercial smugglers.190 As smugglers 
realize that the Border Patrol tends to stop persons of “Hispanic 
appearance,” one would expect them to employ drivers who do not fit the 
profile and are therefore less likely to be stopped.191 
Perhaps more importantly, reliance on group probabilities to justify 
individual stops violates fundamental principles of human dignity at the 
core of the Equal Protection Clause.192 Some might contend that even if 
eighty-five, ninety, or ninety-five percent of the undocumented population 
were of Latin American ancestry, race should still not be considered in the 
decision whether to stop an individual. An analysis of the dignitary harms 
resulting from race profiling in immigration enforcement supports these 
arguments. 
2. The Dignitary Harms 
Although stops and interrogations about citizenship may appear to be 
minimal intrusions to people unlikely to be stopped and interrogated, such 
enforcement practices affect the sense of belonging to U.S. society of 
Latino citizens and immigrants.193 Especially in the Southwest, 
immigration enforcement regularly imposes indignities on citizens and 
 
 
 188. For further discussion of the dignitary harms to Latinos, see infra Parts III.C.2, IV.  
 189. See supra  Part III.B.1. 
 190. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing 
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California , 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 303-04 (1998). 
See also  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , ALIEN SMUGGLING: MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ADDRESS GROWING PROBLEM 12-13 (2000) (describing INS anti-
smuggling strategy and reporting on its deficiencies). 
 191. See Robert L. Bach, Address at the “U.S. Immigration Policy at the Millennium: With 
Liberty and Justice for All?” conference, Harvard Law School (Dec. 4, 1999). 
 192. See infra  Part IV.A. 
 193. See infra  Part IV.B. Race-based immigration enforcement also may result in convictions of 
nonimmigration related crimes that may subject an immigrant to removal from the country. See, e.g., 
United States v. Arvizu, 217 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2000) (invalidating seizure of evidence used in drug 
prosecution based on immigration stop by Border Patrol officer). In this circumstance, race-based 
border enforcement effectively evades the prescription of race profiling in criminal law enforcement. 
See supra  Part II. 
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lawful immigrants of Mexican ancestry that are not imposed on Anglos.194 
The net is cast so wide that large numbers of Latinos in some regions are 
under constant suspicion and are subject to stops and interrogations by 
Border Patrol officers. For example, in the small border town of El 
Cenizo, Texas, which has an eighty percent Spanish-speaking population, 
increased border enforcement has been accompanied by allegations of 
Border Patrol harassment of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants of 
Mexican ancestry.195 As the case law illustrates,196 “Border Patrol officers 
who stop cars based in substantial part on whether the occupants ‘look 
Mexican’ infringe on the freedom of movement of Latinos who are 
permanent resident aliens and citizens as well as those who are 
undocumented.”197 
That the Border Patrol targets persons of “Hispanic appearance” almost 
invariably contributes to the fact that close to ninety percent of the 
removals involve Mexican and Central American citizens, even though 
they only constitute slightly more than one-half of the total undocumented 
population in the United States.198 This, of course, closely resembles the 
self-fulfilling prophesy caused by the race profiling of African Americans 
in criminal law enforcement.199 Similarly, race-based enforcement 
reportedly has led to the unlawful arrest, and sometimes even wrongful 
deportation of U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.200 
 
 
 194. See supra  Part III.C.1-2. 
 195. See Guillermo X. Garcia, Border Battle Centers on ‘Spanish-Only’ Town, USA TODAY, Dec. 
17, 1999, at 21A; Claudia Kolker, Town Speaks the Language of Its People, L.A. T IMES, Aug. 13, 
1999, at A1. See also  Norma Ortiz, Comment, The Dangers of Unguarded Discretion: The 
Unconstitutional Stops of Buses by Roving Patrols, 2 SCHOLAR 289 (2000) (analyzing critically 
Border Patrol seizure of public buses in El Cenizo in search of undocumented immigrants). 
 196. See supra  Part III.B.1. 
 197. Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black or White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 96 (1997) (citation 
omitted). As observed by a federal judge dissenting in a case upholding a Border Patrol stop, “How is 
this practice distinguishable from the former practice of Southern peace officers who randomly 
stopped black pedestrians to inquire, ‘Hey, boy, what are you doin’ in this neighborhood?’” United 
States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 198. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., INS Sets New 
Removals Record (Nov. 12, 1999) (on file with author); supra  text accompanying notes 167-70. There 
are limits to this comparison because aliens may be removed from the country on many other grounds 
besides entering without inspection or violating the terms of a visa. See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(listing many different grounds for removal). The gross disparity at a minimum, however, suggests the 
possibility of racially disparate enforcement and warrants further inquiry. The best way to evaluate the 
impact of race on immigration enforcement would be to consider the percentage of all removable 
aliens who are Latino with the percentage of Latinos in fact removed from the country. 
 199. See supra  text accompanying notes 42-43. 
 200. See, e.g., Diaz v. Reno, 40 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (addressing case in which INS 
was accused of wrongfully deporting U.S. citizen); Suzanne Espinosa, Snafu Underscores Civil Rights 
Issues, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1993, at A1 (recounting story of U.S. citizen arrested by Border Patrol 
while repairing his parents’ roof near Santa Barbara, California, a city hundreds of miles from the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/1
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Ultimately, the injuries suffered by Latino U.S. citizens and lawful 
immigrants are not palpably different from those sustained by innocent 
African Americans whom police officers stop on account of their race.201 
Stops in both circumstances are based on group probabilities, not 
individualized suspicion.202 Resulting harms fall almost exclusively on 
innocent racial minorities.203 According to one prominent commentator, 
such injuries amount to a “tax” imposed on persons of Latin American 
ancestry not assessed on other groups.204 This characterization, although 
acknowledging that race profiling imposes costs on a discrete and insular 
minority, smooths over the emotional turmoil, humiliation, and 
embarrassment caused by the actual experience of a race-based stop.205 It 
also fails to appreciate how race profiling undermines full and equal 
citizenship and stigmatizes Latino U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants in 
the United States.206 
Although frequently overlooked, race-based immigration enforcement 
imposes injustices on undocumented immigrants.207 Even if they are in the 
 
 
border, and sent to Mexico). See also  CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY: REPORT ON THE FIRST T HREE YEARS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL 82-86 
(2000) (describing case of U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry wrongfully detained for 45 days by INS 
because of belief that he was a Mexican citizen using fraudulent documents); Lisa J. LaPlante, 
Expedited Removal at U.S. Borders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 213, 213-14 (1999) (discussing case in which U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry was 
wrongfully deported and contending that such error is more likely to occur with expedited removal 
added by 1996 amendments to immigration laws); Jody A. Benjamin, INS Mistake Gets Citizen 
Deported, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Florida), Dec. 6, 2000, at 1B (reporting on wrongful 
deportation of U.S. citizen); Bob Egelko, INS Settles Two Suits Alleging Mistreatment of Citizens, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Nov. 21, 2000, at A4 (reporting settlement of case of INS harassment of U.S. citizen (a 
doctor) of African ancestry, including shackling and five hours of interrogation, seeking re-entry into 
country from Nigeria); John Moreno Gonzales, McKnight Comes Home, INS Officials Apologize for 
Blunder, NEWSDAY, June 19, 2000, at A7 (discussing U.S. citizen who was wrongfully deported to 
Jamaica); Toni Heinzl, Lost Identity: INS Deports a Man to Mexico Who Might Be an American 
Citizen, FORT WORTH STAR-T ELEGRAM, Nov. 13, 2000, Metro, at 1 (reporting that INS may have 
deported a U.S. citizen to Mexico); Toni Locy, Lawsuit Spotlights Alleged INS Abuses at Airports, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2000, at 11A (reporting that INS officers subjected student returning from 
Jamaica to racial slurs, strip search, and shackles). 
 201. See supra  Part II.A. 
 202. See supra  text accompanying notes 50-52, 94-99. 
 203. See supra Parts II.A, III.C.  
 204. See KENNEDY, supra  note 28, at 159-61. 
 205. See supra  Parts II.A, III.C.2. 
 206. See infra  Part IV.  
 207. See Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 893 (1997) (“[An immigration] policy that disregards the basic human dignity of 
any person, especially one whose violation of the law was motivated by an attraction to the great 
opportunities this country has to offer, is offensive to American ideals and utterly inconsistent with a 
system of ordered immigration.”). See also  Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, International Human 
Rights, Popular Culture, and the Faces of Despair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 245 
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United States in violation of the law, undocumented persons have 
constitutional and human rights. Although the Supreme Court has held that 
they are not a suspect class,208 undocumented immigrants are entitled to 
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection safeguards that cannot be 
trampled upon by the INS in the name of border enforcement.209 For 
precisely this reason, the Supreme Court prohibited exclusive reliance on 
race as the justification for an immigration stop.210 
Border Patrol reliance on race also reinforces negative, ill-conceived 
stereotypes about “Hispanic appearance.” References to “Hispanic 
appearance” is problematic given the fact that the phenotype varies widely 
among persons of Latin American ancestry.211 For example, “[m]ost 
[persons of Mexican ancestry] are of dark complexion with black hair . . . . 
 
 
(1996-97) (analyzing impacts of INS border enforcement on Mexican immigrants and U.S. citizens of 
Mexican descent). For an analysis of the failure of progressive scholars and activists to articulate 
justice-based arguments in the context of California’s Proposition 187 that would have stripped illegal 
immigrants of certain public benefits, see Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented 
Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555 (1996); see also  infra  text 
accompanying notes 320-23 (discussing Proposition 187). 
 208. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). Despite concluding that undocumented persons 
do not constitute a suspect class, the Court in Plyler held that a Texas law barring undocumented 
children from an elementary and secondary education violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 
224-30. A principal concern of the Court in reaching this conclusion was that denying a public 
education to undocumented children “raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident 
aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the 
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.” Id. at 218-19 (footnote 
omitted). See also  Rachel F. Moran, Foreword—Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to 
Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 13-16 (1995) 
(analyzing impacts of Plyler v. Doe on Latino community). Commentators have questioned the 
reasoning of the Court’s decision. See T RIBE , supra  note 80, § 16-23, at 1553 (stating that some 
commentators “will quite properly wish that the Court’s head had proven equal to its heart and that a 
sturdier analytic foundation had been provided for the result reached”). 
 209. See supra Part III.A; supra  text accompanying notes 85-87. Besides being inconsistent with 
domestic constitutional norms, race profiling might also violate international law, such as the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol & Kimberly A. 
Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of 
Immigration and Welfare “Reform,” 71 SO. CAL. L. REV. 547, 568-72 (1998) (contending that various 
provisions of U.S. immigration laws violate the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and other international law). See also  Chin, supra  note 76, at 60-61 (arguing that 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination bars racial discrimination in 
immigration laws). 
 210. See supra  text accompanying notes 88-107. 
 211. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican 
American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1291-93 (1997). See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Bonds 
of American Nationhood, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141, 1165-67 (2000) (summarizing great diversity 
among Latinos). Consequently, it is important not to treat persons of Mexican ancestry as 
homogeneous or to essentialize their experiences. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, 
Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical 
Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503, 513-15 (1998). 
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[b]ut many are blond, blue-eyed and ‘white,’ while others have red hair 
and hazel eyes.”212 The stereotype of the dark haired, brown skinned (often 
linked to “dirty”)213 “Mexican” ignores the rich diversity of physical 
appearances among Latinos. Racially discriminatory immigration 
enforcement may encourage Latinos to, among other things, attempt to 
change their physical appearance and seek to “pass” as Spanish or white, 
with damaging personal consequences.214 The diversity among Latinos 
also suggests that room for error exists when Border Patrol officers seek to 
detect undocumented persons by focusing on the stereotypical “Hispanic 
appearance.” In this respect, the classification is under-inclusive as well as 
over-inclusive.215 
To further complicate matters, “[n]early 1 in 10 U.S. families with 
children is a mixed-status family, that is to say, a family in which one or 
more parents is a noncitizen and one or more children is a citizen.”216 
Thus, a nuclear family with “Hispanic appearances” may have members 
with different immigration statuses, thereby making enforcement efforts 
based on physical appearance more problematic. Moreover, due to family 
ties, some undocumented persons in these families are eligible to become 
lawful permanent residents.217 
 
 
 212. JULIAN SAMORA & PATRICIA VANDEL SIMON, A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN 
PEOPLE 8 (rev. ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 213. See Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 225 (1995) 
(“[A] persistent expression of anti-Mexican prejudice in Texas has been the belief that the skin and 
bodies of Mexicans are dirty, and by extension so too are their habits and morals.”) (footnote omitted). 
See also  John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi’s “Messy” Real World of Race: An Essay for 
“Naked People Longing to Swim Free”, 15 LAW & INEQ. 25, 72 (1997) (referring to the “powerful 
social construction of the ‘dirty Mexican’”) (footnote omitted); Guadalupe T. Luna, “Agricultural 
Underdogs” and International Agreements: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the 
Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 9 (1996) (“The Mexican ‘peon’ (Indian or mixed-breed) is a 
poverty-stricken, ignorant, primitive creature, with strong muscles and just enough brains to obey 
orders and produce profits under competent direction.”) (quoting LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING 
AMERICA : THE STORY OF OUR NATIONHOOD 214 (1927)); United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 
F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that law enforcement suspected an immigration violation in 
part because of automobile “passengers’ dark hair and dark complexions and the fact that they were 
speaking Spanish”) (citation omitted). 
 214. See Johnson, supra  note 211, at 1269-79, 1305-09. See also  Ian F. Haney López, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1994) (analyzing voluntary construction of racial identity by individuals). See generally 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, HOW DID YOU GET TO BE MEXICAN? A WHITE/BROWN MAN’S SEARCH FOR 
IDENTITY  (1999) (analyzing Latino efforts at assimilation). 
 215. For an analysis of the over-inclusiveness of “Hispanic appearance” in determining 
undocumented status, see supra  Part III.C.1. 
 216. Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in an Era of 
Reform  1 (June 1999), available at http://www.urban.org/immig/all_under.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2000). 
 217. See INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (adjustment of status); id.  § 240A, § 1229b 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p675 Johnson.doc  4/26/01   4:43 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:675 
 
 
 
 
As race-based law enforcement breeds cynicism about the criminal 
justice system in minority communities,218 race profiling in immigration 
enforcement also foments distrust of government and discourages lawful 
permanent residents from Mexico from fully embracing an American 
national identity.219 Such distrust may well contribute to the historically 
low naturalization rates of Mexican immigrants.220 Similarly, by placing a 
cloud over the citizenship status of virtually all Latinos, race-based 
enforcement also serves to limit Latino social integration into mainstream 
society. Although some commentators claim that immigration from Latin 
America should be curtailed because of Latinos’ alleged failure to 
assimilate, race-based immigration enforcement constitutes an important 
impediment to Latino integration.221 
In light of its substantial injuries, race profiling in immigration law 
enforcement is a serious problem that deserves careful scrutiny. Until this 
problem is recognized, the evils of race profiling will fall 
disproportionately on persons of Latin American ancestry and others who 
appear “foreign.” The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to revisit 
Brignoni-Ponce and bring it into line with modern constitutional 
sensibilities.222 
IV. BORDER ENFORCEMENT AND THE DEFINITION OF UNEQUAL 
CITIZENSHIP FOR LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Historically, domestic civil rights law and immigration law have been 
closely linked in the United States.223 For example, the prohibition on 
 
 
(cancellation of removal). 
 218. See supra  text accompanying note 47.  
 219. See Gutiérrez, supra  note 181 (analyzing formation of national identity by Mexican 
immigrants to United States and general distrust of government resulting from experiences with the 
INS). 
 220. See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 140 tbl.K (showing that for 
immigrants admitted in fiscal year 1997, 32.2% of Mexican immigrants naturalized compared to 
52.8% of immigrants from all countries). See also  supra  text accompanying note 47 (noting that race 
profiling breeds contempt and cynicism in minority communities toward law enforcement). In 
response to political setbacks for immigrants in the 1990s, see generally IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW 
NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997), 
naturalization rates among Mexican immigrants have been on the rise, which has generated claims of 
naturalization abuse and calls for reform. See infra  text accompanying note 303. 
 221. For an analysis of these issues, see Johnson, supra  note 211; George A. Martínez, Latinos, 
Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1999); Sylvia 
R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative 
and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 T UL. L. REV. 1493 (1998).  
 222. See infra  text accompanying notes 242-46. 
 223. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: 
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Chinese immigration in the 1800s coincided with repressive anti-Chinese 
legislation aimed at the Chinese population in the country.224 In the early 
twentieth century, the “alien land” laws, which restricted alien ownership 
of real property, paved the way for Japanese internment during World War 
II and followed successful efforts to greatly restrict Japanese 
immigration.225 Enacted in an era when nativism ran amok in the United 
States, the 1924 national origins quota system limited immigration from 
eastern and southern Europe.226 Various legal restrictions on immigration 
from Africa, as well as the U.S. government’s refusal to offer a safe haven 
to refugees fleeing Haiti in the 1980s and 1990s, mirrors the disfavored 
status of African Americans in this country.227 
The treatment of persons of Latin American ancestry under the 
immigration laws offers further evidence of the connection between 
immigration and civil rights. Race profiling in immigration enforcement 
confirms that Latinos, whether citizens or lawful immigrants, enjoy fewer 
membership rights than Anglos.228 Raced-based immigration enforcement 
is simply only one of many aspects of immigration law that creates 
“partial membership”229 or more colloquially, second-class citizenship, for 
Latinos in the United States. In invalidating a law that discriminated on the 
basis of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court emphasized that “laws 
singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general 
 
 
A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J.  1111 (1998) (analyzing historical 
relationship between racial discrimination in immigration laws and domestic civil rights). 
 224. See generally CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH FOR EQUALITY  (1994) (documenting 
resistance of Chinese community to discriminatory laws and practices in nineteenth century). 
 225. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a 
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998) (analyzing “alien land” laws as part of anti-Japanese 
history in California culminating in internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II). 
 226. See supra  text accompanying note 73. 
 227. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding interdiction and 
repatriation of Haitians fleeing political violence and economic turmoil in their homeland); Bill Ong 
Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOW. L.J. 237 (1994) 
(discussing how immigration laws discriminate against African immigrants); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
“Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994) (criticizing U.S. 
government’s policy toward Haitian refugees). Class, cultural, and foreign policy concerns influenced 
the United States harsh policies directed at Haitian migrants. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial 
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch’s Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in 
Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993); see also 
John A. Scanlan, Call and Response: The Particular and the General, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 660-
70 (discussing personal experiences with studying U.S. policy toward Haitians). 
 228. See generally STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (studying invisible privilege attached to whiteness in United States); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (analyzing whiteness as a 
valuable property right in U.S. society). 
 229. See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996). 
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hardships are rare.”230 Judicially condoned race profiling in immigration 
enforcement, however, singles out Latino citizens for a “disfavored legal 
status” and “general hardships.”231 
Although scholars and policymakers have directed much attention to 
immigration reform in recent years, precious little attention has been paid 
to the civil rights implications of immigration enforcement. For example, 
the blue-ribbon U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform prepared a 
series of reports on immigration reform in the 1990s, including one 
offering detailed recommendations on curbing undocumented migration to 
the United States.232 A product of a time when public opinion considered 
undocumented migration to be out of control,233 the report endorsed 
heightened border enforcement strategies with significantly increased 
resources, with precious little consideration for the potential loss of life.234 
Border Patrol abuses received scant attention; race-based immigration 
enforcement evaded study.235 Indeed, three years after issuing its initial 
recommendations calling for bolstered border enforcement, the 
Commission reiterated its commitment to the expansion of enforcement 
operations, despite recognizing the “human toll,” including “increased 
violence along the border, as well as deaths resulting from exposure to 
extreme weather in mountain and desert areas.”236 
One can only wonder why the civil and human rights consequences of 
race profiling in immigration enforcement, and border enforcement 
generally, are ignored. Factors contributing to this ignorance no doubt 
include the stereotype of Latinos as foreigners and the perception that 
 
 
 230. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (invalidating Colorado law, which effectively 
repealed state and local laws barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 231. Id. at 633. 
 232. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY , supra  note 149. 
 233. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1994) (stating that, at that time, “[p]ublic officials and citizens groups 
[had] begun to promote a series of legal initiatives designed to respond to the perceived ‘immigration 
crisis’”) (citation omitted).  
 234. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY , supra note 149, at 
11-19. See also  David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 684-86 (2000) (discussing enforcement operations without accounting for loss 
of life). 
 235. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, RESTORING CREDIBILITY , supra note 149, at 
19-21 (advocating improved complaint procedures for abuses and like-minded measures). To be fair, 
the Commission made recommendations on ways to reduce discrimination by employers against 
national origin minorities in the workplace. See id. at 76-88. 
 236. U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND 
IMMIGRANT POLICY  107 (1997). See infra  Part IV.A.1-2, B (describing human costs of increased 
border enforcement). 
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undocumented immigrants are criminals who deserve harsh treatment.237 
Whatever the cause of the past failure to address the issue, race profiling in 
immigration enforcement now warrants our full attention. 
A. Race Profiling Constitutes a Civil Rights Violation 
In allowing the consideration of race in immigration stops, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.238 This ruling, however, implicates 
core Equal Protection values in providing individuals with full 
membership and equal citizenship.239 In United States v. Montero-
Camargo,240 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Equal 
Protection precedent endorsing color blindness in governmental action, 
and held that the Border Patrol could not consider “Hispanic appearance” 
in making immigration stops.241  
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning finds plentiful support in modern Equal 
Protection doctrine, which emphasizes the need for racial neutrality in the 
law.242 As Justice Scalia enthusiastically proclaimed, “‘Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”243 
 
 
 237. See supra  Part III. 
 238. See supra  Part III.A. 
 239. See supra  Part III.C.  
 240. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
 241. The court cited, inter alia , Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1135. See 
also  Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of 
Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425 (1997) 
(stating that Adarand suggested that federal, like state, alienage classifications should be subject to 
strict scrutiny). 
 242. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (invalidating federal program 
designed to promote diversity of federal contractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989) (holding similar program adopted by a city to be unconstitutional). See also  Rice v. 
Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (invalidating state law permitting only native Hawaiians to vote for 
trustees of state agency under Fifteenth Amendment); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (invalidating 
legislative districts as impermissibly relying on race under Fourteenth Amendment); Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that plaintiffs stated claim of impermissible consideration of race in 
legislative redistricting); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding the affirmative 
action program of the University of Texas School of Law unconstitutional). Commentators have 
criticized the use of a color-blindness rationale to prohibit affirmative action and related programs 
aimed at remedying past discrimination. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND 
FUTURE : THE PARADOX OF RACE  (1998); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color 
Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 
“Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 
(2000). 
 243. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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During the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held 
that all racial classifications, even those in federal and state affirmative 
action programs designed to remedy past discrimination or promote 
diversity, warrant strict scrutiny. As a result, a number of affirmative 
action and related government programs have been invalidated.244 Along 
similar lines, the Court has employed heightened scrutiny to invalidate 
gender classifications based on outdated stereotypes about women.245 In so 
doing, the Court emphasized that “gender classifications that rest on 
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when 
some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”246 
Overbroad generalizations about the immigration status of Latinos, 
however, still serve as the principal underpinning for race profiling in 
immigration enforcement.247 
The Supreme Court’s statement in Brignoni-Ponce that the Border 
Patrol may lawfully consider race as a factor justifying an immigration 
stop stands woefully out of line with today’s Equal Protection doctrine.248 
Race, although arguably ignored by the courts as influencing law 
enforcement in their Fourth Amendment analysis of criminal law,249 is an 
approved factor for consideration in immigration enforcement. 
Conventional Equal Protection jurisprudence would condemn the use of 
“Hispanic appearance” as a factor in an immigration stop,250 at least so 
long as a witness did not identify a person of “Hispanic appearance” as 
 
 
 244. For case citations, see supra  note 242. 
 245. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (holding that male-only admission 
policy of Virginia Military Institute violated Equal Protection Clause and emphasizing that gender 
classifications “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females”) (citation omitted); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) 
(holding that the exercise of peremptory challenges based on gender in jury selection violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and emphasizing that heightened scrutiny applies to gender-based 
classifications because of the risk that they may reflect “‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations about 
gender . . . based on ‘outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home’”) (citations 
omitted). See also  Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 469-70 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(collecting authorities on impermissibility of relying on gender stereotypes in law).  
 246. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 (citing inter alia , Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976) 
(invalidating Oklahoma law that adopted different drinking ages for men and women even though 
evidence in support of differentiation was “not trivial in a statistical sense”) (emphasis added). 
 247. See supra  Parts III.A., C.1. 
 248. See Robert Alan Culp, Note, The Immigration and Naturalization Service and Racially 
Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the Fourth Amendment Left Off? , 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1986) (arguing that INS consideration of race implicates Equal Protection 
concerns); Note, supra  note 142, at 1997-2000 (contending that INS reliance on race in enforcement 
violates Equal Protection Clause). 
 249. See supra  Introduction in Part II and text accompanying notes 53-67. 
 250. See supra  Part III.C.  
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having violated the immigration laws.251 As in the criminal context,252 the 
Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Fourth Amendment, might serve 
as the more appropriate constitutional vehicle for challenging race-based 
border enforcement.253 Although the federal government must honor the 
Equal Protection guarantee,254 any potential plaintiff would face the same 
formidable barriers encountered by victims of race profiling in criminal 
law enforcement, namely the need to prove discriminatory intent.255 To 
contemplate the possibility of providing an Equal Protection remedy for 
reliance on race in immigration enforcement, however, Congress or the 
judiciary must first remove race from the litany of lawful factors to 
consider by the INS in making an immigration stop. Absent that change, 
virtually no Equal Protection claim can prevail except in the most 
egregious of circumstances. 
Race-based immigration enforcement cannot be legally defended on 
plenary power doctrine grounds. Immigration enforcement within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States is outside the purview of the 
plenary power doctrine.256 Persons of Latin American ancestry in the 
country enjoy constitutional rights that cannot be infringed. Even in the 
heyday of Chinese exclusion, the Supreme Court held that discriminatory 
enforcement of local laws against persons of Chinese ancestry in the 
United States violated the Constitution.257 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Brignoni-Ponce acknowledged that the plenary power doctrine did not 
immunize the U.S. government from the constraints of the Constitution in 
its encounters with undocumented persons inside our borders.258 
 
 
 251. For an analysis of the law on this issue in the criminal law enforcement context, see supra 
text accompanying notes 60-61. 
 252. See supra  text accompanying notes 53-56. 
 253. For authorities, see supra  note 245. 
 254. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212-37; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 255. See supra  note 56 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra  text accompanying notes 68-79 (discussing plenary power doctrine as a limit on 
judicial review of congressional judgments about which categories of immigrants to admit into the 
United States).  
 257. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See generally Thomas Wuil Joo, New 
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases 
and the Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353 (1995) 
(analyzing Yick Wo  as part of Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence protecting economic rights). 
 258. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883-84. See also  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) 
(holding that Texas law barring undocumented children in state from public elementary and secondary 
education violated Equal Protection Clause). In so stating, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce emphasized 
that:  
[a]lthough we may assume for purposes of this case that the broad congressional power over 
immigration . . . authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition that they will submit to 
reasonable questioning about their right to be and remain in the country, this power cannot 
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Nor can “Hispanic appearance” constitute a valid nationality-based 
distinction similar to some valid classifications in the immigration laws. 
“Hispanic appearance,” a trait shared by U.S. citizens, Latin American 
nationals, and citizens of other countries, is simply too broad to constitute 
a nationality-based classification.259 Physical appearance is a weak proxy 
for nationality and cannot be employed by the INS to enforce the 
immigration laws. 
In essence, the endorsement of race-based immigration enforcement 
under the Fourth Amendment conflicts with the Equal Protection 
guarantee of equal citizenship for all. In order to bring immigration law 
into line with modern Equal Protection doctrine, Congress removed racial 
prerequisites for immigration260 and citizenship261 from the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. By placing race at the forefront, race profiling in 
immigration enforcement bucks this trend and represents a stark anomaly 
in the law. The current law on immigration stops exacerbates racial 
discrimination in immigration enforcement and tangibly harms Latinos in 
the United States. 
1. Latino Injuries 
Part III of this Article reviewed the dignitary harms to persons subject 
to race-based interrogation of their citizenship status. Race profiling 
deeply harms the Latino community as a whole as well as the individuals 
 
 
diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens. For the 
same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to inquire if 
they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the country, it also forbids stopping or detaining 
persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they 
may be aliens. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883-84 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 259. See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding Presidential order for 
all Iranian students in U.S. to report to INS and demonstrate lawful presence in country); see also Bill 
Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 601 (noting 
“harassment of all Iranian students in the United States in response to the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis”) 
(footnote omitted). Race and nationality among Latinos often are conflated; in fact, Latinos comprise 
many different national origin groups. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Borders 
(En)Gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm , 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997) 
(analyzing conflation); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as’ Race 
and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69 (1998) (same). 
 260. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (eliminating discriminatory national origin quotas systems in place 
since 1924 from U.S. immigration law). 
 261. See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996) (analyzing racial prerequisite for citizenship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY  (1997) (summarizing history of limitations on citizenship in 
U.S. law). 
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stopped. By deviating from the race-neutral norm, race-based immigration 
enforcement stigmatizes persons of “Hispanic appearance” and undercuts 
their claim to membership and citizenship in U.S. society in at least two 
distinct ways.262 First, race profiling marginalizes Latinos by subjecting 
them to concrete harms not suffered by persons of other groups.263 Race 
profiling singles Latinos out as a group for immigration inquiries and 
reinforces their suspect and subordinated status in the United States. 
Second, concerted efforts to remove persons of certain national origin 
groups from the country—in this instance, persons of Hispanic 
appearance—diminishes the status of persons who share that characteristic 
who are lawfully in the country.264 By effectively telling Latinos that they 
are unwanted in the United States, the legally sanctioned use of race in 
immigration law enforcement runs afoul of the guarantee of equal 
citizenship to all citizens and undermines a person’s right to “belong[] to 
America.”265 “Stops based on race or ethnic appearance send the 
underlying message to all . . . citizens that those who are not white are 
 
 
 262. See Richmond, 488 U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that 
remedial programs that consider race impose “stigma on its supposed beneficiaries”); Johnson, supra 
note 223, at 1148-53 (analyzing stigma imposed on minority groups by racial exclusions in 
immigration law). See also  Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. 
COMMENTARY  257 (1996) (contending that Equal Protection Clause should be invoked to invalidate 
classifications tending to make certain outgroups into pariahs); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial 
Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic 
Citizenship , 60 OHIO ST. L.J.  399, 522-25 (1999) (analyzing stigmatic harm caused by laws targeting 
minorities and how those laws undermine civic participation); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 MICH . L. REV. 2410 (1994) (arguing that Equal Protection Clause should strike down 
laws that facilitate creation of castes). 
 263. See supra  Part III.B.  
 264. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the 
National Government, 1977 SUP.  CT.  REV. 275, 327 (contending that racial or national origin 
classification limiting admission of immigrants “would . . . require strict scrutiny, not because of the 
injury to the aliens denied admission, but rather because of the injury to American citizens of the same 
race or national origin who are stigmatized by the classification”). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Whose 
Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1947 (1996) 
(reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER (1995)) (“[I]mmigration law that excludes members of a particular race or ethnicity may 
cast a stigma on that  group. Unless the government can show a compelling interest, any such stigma 
violates the bedrock equal protection prohibition against treating any person as inferior to another by 
virtue of race or ethnicity.”) (citations omitted). 
 265. I borrow this phrase from KENNETH L. KARST,  BELONGING TO AMERICA :  EQUAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989). See also  Richard A. Reeves, A Reporter at Large: Boyle 
Heights and Beyond, NEW YORKER, Sept. 14, 1981, at 116, 130 (“It all gives you the feeling that you 
don’t really belong here . . . . You’re always ready to prove you’re a citizen, that you’re an American, 
that you belong.”) (quoting third generation Mexican American on citizenship). As Professor Karst 
cogently observes, “The sense of belonging is a basic human need, vital to every individual’s sense of 
self.” Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 
303 (1986). 
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judged by the color of their skin alone. Such stops also send a clear 
message that those who are not white enjoy a lesser degree of 
constitutional protection . . . .”266 One commentator goes so far as to 
suggest that the harms caused by race profiling in immigration 
enforcement exceed those caused by ordinary race profiling in criminal 
law enforcement: 
[C]onveying doubt about an individual’s right to belong in the 
country . . . strikes at the heart of one’s claim to actual equal 
membership in society. . . . Hispanics—specifically targeted by the 
INS—cannot take for granted the right to full participation in 
American society. . . . [Q]uestioning by INS agents that challenges 
one’s right to be in the country . . .—much less one’s claim to equal 
membership—is likely to be acutely disturbing and, therefore, 
enormously intrusive.267 
Immigration scholarship analyzing the definition and meaning of 
membership in the national community and the rights accorded lawful 
immigrants reveals much about the impact of race profiling in immigration 
enforcement on Latinos.268 Although the political climate at various times 
has resulted in the narrowing of rights afforded to lawful permanent 
residents,269 the bundle of rights in the current era closely resembles those 
of citizens. Indeed, one influential observer disparages the rough equality 
of treatment of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants as the “devaluation of 
American citizenship.”270 A membership objection to race profiling in 
criminal law enforcement might center on its harms to innocent persons of 
minority groups (for example, African Americans and Latinos),271 who 
effectively enjoy diluted membership rights. Race profiling in immigration 
enforcement similarly dilutes the membership rights of lawful immigrants 
from Latin America and Latino citizens. 
 
 
 266. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1135. 
 267. David K. Chan, Note, INS Factory Raids as Nondetentive Seizures, 95 YALE L.J. 767, 773 
(1986) (citation omitted). 
 268. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 
CONST.  COMMENTARY  9 (1990); Bosniak, supra  note 233; David A. Martin, Due Process and 
Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. P ITT. L. REV. 165 
(1983); Scaperlanda, supra  note 229. 
 269. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership , 22 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 915 (1995) (analyzing how lawful immigrants were experiencing loss of rights as result of a 
“tightening circle of membership”). See generally IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra  note 220 (analyzing 
restrictionist measures of 1990s). 
 270. See Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American 
Citizenship , 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  1 (1989). 
 271. See supra  Parts II.A, III.C.  
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s sanction of the use of race in 
immigration enforcement authorizes stark civil rights violations that limit 
Latino citizenship rights. These decisions make it clear that Latino citizens 
and lawful immigrants may be subject to immigration stops primarily due 
to their physical appearance.272 Race profiling in immigration enforcement 
is therefore based on and further reinforces the perception that persons of 
Latin American ancestry, citizens and noncitizens alike, are 
“foreigners.”273 This erroneous perception ignores that a population of 
persons of Mexican ancestry lived in the West and Southwest long before 
those territories became part of the United States.274 The prevailing myth 
of national identity allows Latinos to be classified and treated as 
“foreigners” and Anglos as native to this land.275 In sum, Latinos enjoy 
less than full membership rights in the United States due to racially 
discriminatory immigration enforcement.276 
2. Harms to Other “Foreigners” 
Minority groups other than Latinos also suffer the dignitary harms of 
race-based immigration enforcement. These groups have specific histories 
and varying stereotypical characteristics attached to their “foreigner” 
status. For example, persons of Asian ancestry are often automatically 
questioned about their immigration status.277 During World War II, the 
 
 
 272. See supra  Part III.B.1. 
 273. See supra Part III.B-C. Cf. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (“When state actors exercise peremptory 
challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative 
abilities of men and women . . . . [T]hese stereotypes have wreaked in justice in so many . . . spheres of 
our country’s public life . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 274. See generally T HE LEGACY OF THE MEXICAN AND SPANISH -AMERICAN WARS: LEGAL, 
LITERARY , AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary D. Keller & Cordelia Cordelaria eds., 2000) 
(collecting essays analyzing Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo from different perspectives); RICHARD 
GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, T HE T REATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICT (1990) 
(recounting history surrounding Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the U.S.-Mexican War in 
1848, ceded Mexican territory to the United States, and allowed Mexican citizens in territory to 
become U.S. citizens); Symposium, Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on its 150th 
Anniversary, 5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 5 (1998) (studying legal history of enforcement of treaty). 
 275. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 268-81 (1997) (analyzing role of race in formation 
of national identity and citizenship rights). 
 276. See generally ACUÑA , supra  note 124 (analyzing history of subordination of Mexican 
Americans in United States); ALMAGUER, supra  note 124 (studying this history in California). 
 277. See Keith Aoki, “Foreign-Ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II 
Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.  1 (1996); Neil 
Gotanda, “Other Non-Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1186 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race 
and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 429-38 
(1996); Saito, supra  note 275; see also  Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and 
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United States government reacted to the long-standing perception of 
Asians as “foreign” and of suspect allegiance to the United States, by 
forcing persons of Japanese ancestry, citizens and noncitizens alike, on the 
west coast into internment camps because of their potential sympathy for 
the Japanese government.278 Foreigner bias apparently contributed to the 
trumped up espionage charges against Dr. Wen Ho Lee, who was recently 
accused of turning over U.S. nuclear secrets to the Chinese government.279 
It also seems to have resulted in the questioning of certain Asian 
Americans about their citizenship status after allegations that President 
Clinton accepted illegal “foreign” campaign contributions from them.280 
More commonly, employers often suspect that Asian American job 
applicants are in the country unlawfully and presumptively not lawfully 
eligible for employment.281 Not surprisingly, INS officers consider race in 
attempting to enforce the immigration laws against immigrants from 
Asia.282 INS inspectors at ports of entry reportedly rely on “profiles” based 
on nationality and racial distinctions to inspect travelers from particular 
Asian countries.283 
 
 
Latinos as “Foreigners,” and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 352-58 
(1997) (analyzing similarities in Latino and Asian American experiences in their characterization as 
“foreigners”). See generally ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE 
NATION-STATE (1999) (analyzing position of Asian Americans in U.S. society). 
 278. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally Symposium, The Long 
Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1998) (collecting essays 
analyzing Korematsu  and its impact). 
 279. See William J. Broad, Official Asserts Spy Case Suspect Was a Bias Victim , N.Y. T IMES, 
Aug. 18, 1999, at A1. See also  Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the 
Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000) (analyzing racial profiling of Asian Americans in 
Lee case); see also  James Glanz, Fallout in Arms Research, N.Y. T IMES, July 16, 2000, § 1, at 1 
(reporting that Asian and Asian American scientists are avoiding employment at national weapons 
laboratories because of pattern and practice of racial discrimination). Eventua lly Lee, after nine 
months in custody, pleaded guilty to a single offense of mishandling nuclear secrets, and was released. 
See James Sterngold, Nuclear Scientist Set Free After Plea in Secrets Case, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 14, 
2000, at A1. 
 280. See Frank H. Wu, The Campaign Contributions Fiasco and Racial Stereotyping: The Asian-
American Connection, LEG. T IMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at 24. 
 281. See supra  note 149 (discussing reports on discrimination by employers against persons of 
Asian and Latin American ancestry). 
 282. See, e.g., Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that Asian 
appearance combined with other factors justified INS stop); Matter of King and Yang, 16 I. & N. Dec. 
502, 504-05 (BIA 1978) (stating that “Oriental appearance, combined with the past history of illegal 
alien employment at that particular restaurant, and the anonymous tip” justified INS questioning of 
waiter and dishwasher about citizenship status). 
 283. See Janet A. Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In: Decisionmaking By Immigration Inspectors, 25 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571, 584-90 (1991) (reporting results of study of INS inspection practices). See 
also  Florangela Davila, Hardline INS Under Fire in ‘Deportland’, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 
B5 (reporting that INS inspectors at Portland International Airport had a bad reputation in Asia for 
denying entry to citizens of Asian nations). Cf. supra  note 123 (describing use of race and class 
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Similarly, the waning years of the twentieth century saw public and 
social stereotyping of Arab Americans as suspected “foreign” terrorists.284 
Persons of Arab ancestry in the United States have long suffered 
discrimination.285 The erroneous claim that Middle Eastern terrorists were 
responsible for the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, spurred the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.286 This Act dramatically changed the immigration 
laws by, inter alia, curtailing judicial review of many removal decisions, 
enhancing INS powers to detain aliens, and creating special proceedings 
with “secret evidence” not disclosed to the alien for the removal of “alien 
terrorists,” which have been used almost exclusively against persons from 
the Middle East.287 
Immigration enforcement also has focused on other racial groups. For 
example, in Orhorhaghe v. INS ,288 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
 
 
profiles by State Department consular officers denying immigrant visa applications). 
 284. See Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological 
Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  51, 108-13 (1999) (presenting evidence of bias against Arabs and 
Muslims in enforcement of immigration and anti-terrorism laws). The U.S. government’s deep concern 
with Arab terrorism can be seen in a study of extradition cases showing that persons linked with the 
Irish Republican Army won two-thirds of their extradition cases while those even loosely affiliated 
with the Palestinian Liberation Organization failed to win a single case. See BARBARA M. YARNOLD, 
INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES: A NEW ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 36-37 (1991). 
 285. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13 (1987) (holding that person 
of Arab ancestry was protected by law prohibiting racial discrimination). 
 286. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 423, 502, 110 Stat. 1272, 1282. See Note, Blown Away? The Bill of 
Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074 (1996). See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. 
Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting writ of habeas corpus in case of Palestinian man detained for 
over one year based on secret evidence of alleged terrorist activity that failed to convince immigration 
court); Public Record Evidence Insufficient to Support Al Najjar’s Detention, 77 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1566 (Nov. 6, 2000) (reporting that immigration judge found no evidence supporting INS 
claim that Middle Eastern immigrant detained for three years in fact engaged in any terrorist activity). 
Similarly, an episode on the “60 Minutes” television show about a Muslim cleric later convicted of 
criminal involvement in the World Trade Center bombing led to congressional hearings and the 
subsequent amendment of immigration laws allowing expedited removal of certain aliens at ports of 
entry. See INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (Supp. III 1997); PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: 
T HE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 42-45 (2000) (recounting 
immediate congressional response on expedited removal to 60 Minutes segment); 60 Minutes: How 
Did He Get Here? (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 14, 1993) (detailing how cleric had sought asylum 
in United States).  
 287. See Mary Abowd, Arab-Americans Suffer Hatred After Bombing, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 13, 
1995, The Forum, at 14; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Terror in Oklahoma: Arab Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 1995, at B10. U.S. citizens were later convicted for their role in the bombing. See United States v. 
Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 336 (1999); United States v. 
McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999); see also  Andrew 
Cockburn, The Radicalization of James Woolsey, N.Y. T IMES, July 23, 2000, § 6, at 26 (discussing 
frustration of former director of Central Intelligence Agency in obtaining information about Iraqi 
citizen detained based on secret evidence).  
 288. 38 F.3d 488, 498 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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Circuit held that a person’s possession of a “Nigerian-sounding name,” 
which the court reasoned might serve as a proxy for race, was insufficient 
to justify an INS stop.289 In short, the impact of race profiling in 
immigration enforcement adversely impacts many racial minorities. 
B. Immigration Law Helps Define and Limit Latino Membership in U.S. 
Society 
Unfortunately, core features of immigration law in addition to race 
profiling contribute to less than full membership in U.S. society for 
persons of Latin American ancestry. The public charge exclusion, which 
bars admission of immigrants “likely at any time to become a public 
charge,”290 has a disparate impact on working class and low income 
citizens and lawful immigrants of Latin American ancestry who seek to 
bring family members to the United States.291 The annual per-country 
ceilings impose a longer waiting period for potential Mexican immigrants, 
many of whom seek to join family members residing lawfully in the 
country, than that faced by similarly situated immigrants from other 
nations.292 For the most part, the diversity visa system excludes Mexican 
immigrants and favors potential immigrants from Europe.293 By 
diminishing the rights of Mexican American citizens and lawful 
immigrants seeking to bring family members to this country, these 
 
 
 289. See Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 497; see also  Brent v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999) (discusing allegations that U.S. customs inspector subjected African American women 
returning from Nigeria to inspections based on racial profile); supra  note 88 (discussing race-based 
inspections by customs officers at ports of entry). The court held that the immigration officers’ 
“egregious” conduct justified application of the exclusionary rule. See Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 503. 
See also  supra  text accompanying notes 157-60 (discussing exclusionary rule in removal proceedings). 
 290. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). 
 291. For analysis of the 1996 amendments that toughened the public charge exclusion ground, see 
Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immigration Act: Affidavits of Support and Public Benefits, 74 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 317 (1997); Charles Wheeler, The New Affidavit of Support and Sponsorship Requirements, 
74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1581 (1997). 
 292. See Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mexico, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 
713. For example, prospective first preferences (unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens) from 
Mexico who applied in October 1993 had visas available in November 1999, while similarly situated 
nationals from almost every other nation who applied in August 1998 had visas available in November 
1999. See U.S. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR NOVEMBER 1999, at 2 
(1999). 
 293. See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 46-47 tbl.9 (noting that eighteen 
Mexicans, as compared to nearly 3400 Poles received diversity immigrant visas in fiscal year 1997). 
See also  Bernard P. Wolfsdorf & Naveen Rahman, The Diversity Lottery: Asians and Latinos Need 
Not Apply!, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Sept. 2000, at 14 (stating that diversity visa program “emerged 
from an ill-advised attempt to benefit primarily Caucasian immigrants at the expense of Asians and 
Latinos”). 
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measures conflict with fundamental equality principles.294 
Other immigration enforcement developments further undermine the 
Latino sense of belonging to the United States. For example, the U.S. 
government in the last few decades militarized the southern border in a 
concerted effort to halt undocumented migration from Mexico, while the 
nation’s northern border with Canada remains relatively free from 
obstruction despite concerns with unlawful activity in this area.295  
Moreover, heightened border enforcement focuses disproportionately 
on the undocumented Mexican population in the United States. As of 
October 1996, slightly over forty percent undocumented persons had 
entered the country legally with the requisite papers but overstayed or 
otherwise violated the terms of their visas.296 Visa overstays are generally 
unaffected by heightened border security measures, which by their nature 
concentrate on unlawful entry.297 Moreover, only “[a]bout 16 percent of 
the Mexican undocumented population are nonimmigrant overstays, 
compared to 26 percent of those from Central America, and 91 percent 
from all other countries.”298 
Monumental race-based immigration enforcement efforts came at a 
time when the best-selling book on immigration in the 1990s expressly 
stated that immigration from Latin America should be drastically curtailed 
because of race.299 A prominent scholar also lamented the immigration of 
 
 
 294. See supra  Parts III.C.2, IV.A. 
 295. See Memorandum from Acting Inspector General, to Commissioner, I.N.S., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Border Patrol Effects Along the Northern Border (Feb. 18, 
2000) (on file with author) (concluding based on review of fiscal years 1993-98 that the Canadian 
“border sectors were 14 times as likely to encounter an alien involved with smuggling weapons and 9 
times as likely to encounter an alien involved with smuggling drugs than sectors along the southwest 
[Mexican] border” and that smuggling of migrants from certain countries was on the rise on Canadian 
border). See also  Testimony of Mark P. Hall, President National Border Patrol Council, Before House 
Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV., Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony of Border Patrol agent on U.S.-Canada 
border) (noting that “[a]s of September 1998 approximately 7,357 Border Patrol Agents protect our 
1,945 miles of southwest border with Mexico” compared to 289 to protect our 3,987 miles of northern 
border with Canada, such that “the southwest border has 25 times the manpower than the northern 
border”). Attention to the Canadian border increased with the arrest on the eve of the new millennium 
of an Algerian man allegedly seeking to smuggle bomb-making materials into the United States from 
Canada. See John Kifner, Terrorists Said to Hide in Canada’s Melting Pot, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 24, 
1999, at A8. This incident unfortunately may result in increased suspicion of all Middle Eastern 
immigrants to the United States. See supra  text accompanying notes 284-87. 
 296. See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 199. 
 297. For a description of militarization of U.S. -Mexico border, see supra note 295 and 
accompanying text; infra  notes 304-13 and accompanying text. 
 298. 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra  note 169, at 199. 
 299. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER (1995). In making the argument, Brimelow ominously proclaimed that “the American 
nation has always had a specific ethnic core. And that core has been white.” Id. at 10 (emphasis 
added). See also  Richard Brookhiser, AMERICA: Pluribus, and Unum , NAT’L REV., Jan. 24, 2000 
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low-skilled immigrants from Mexico and other developing nations, people 
who, he claimed, were prone to welfare dependency,300 a variant of the 
controversial “culture of poverty” thesis popularized in the 1960s as an 
explanation for African American poverty in the United States.301 Some 
commentators consider proposals to limit birthright citizenship302 and 
reform the naturalization process due to alleged abuses303 as veiled efforts 
to discourage persons of Mexican ancestry from settling in the United 
States. 
The human toll on Latin American citizens, expecially of Mexican 
ancestry, along the southern border sends similar messages of exclusion. 
For example, U.S. Marines patrolling the border mistakenly shot and 
killed a young goatherder, a U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry.304 Such 
 
 
(making similar arguments); Patrick J. Buchanan, Trouble in the Neighborhood, at 
http://www.buchananreform.com/library (last visited Nov. 12, 2000) (speech of 2000 Presidential 
candidate Patrick Buchanan calling for increased border enforcement because increasing percentage of 
persons of Mexican ancestry in Southwest may lead to its reconquest by Mexico). For scrutiny of race 
and class subtexts to the modern immigration debate, see BILL ONG HING, T O BE AN AMERICAN: 
CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION (1997). See also  Richard Delgado, 
Rodrigo’s Bookbag: Brimelow, Bork, Herrnstein, Murray, and D’Souza—Recent Conservative 
Thought and the End of Equality, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1929 (1998) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK , 
SLOUCHING T OWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); DINESH 
D’SOUZA , THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY  (1995)); PETER 
BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); 
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS 
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994)). 
 300. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY  (1999). 
 301. See, e.g., Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY : 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1969); Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, reprinted in  T HE MOYNIHAN REPORT 
AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY  (Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds., 1967). 
 302. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
54, 55-56 & nn.5-8 (1997) (describing proposals). See, e.g., Charles Wood, Losing Control of 
America’s Future—The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 465 (1999) (contending that statutory changes need be made to eliminate birthright citizenship 
and to end counting of undocumented persons in U.S. Census). Such proposals find intellectual 
support in PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). 
 303. See Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 
U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 197-209 (1998) (analyzing controversy over naturalization in 1990s). 
 304. See AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN THE 
BORDER REGION WITH MEXICO 44-47 (1998) (describing events surrounding killing of Esequiel 
Hernandez, a U.S. citizen of Mexican ancestry, by U.S. Marines patrolling U.S.-Mexico border). See 
also  American Friends Service Comm., Human and Civil Rights Violations on the U.S.-Mexico Border 
1995-97 (documenting human rights abuses along border by Border Patrol and others), available at 
http://www.afsc.org/border.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2000); Ken Ellingwood, U.S. Agents Posed 
Suspect with Humiliating Sign, Lawyers Say, L.A. T IMES, May 21, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Border 
Patrol forced Mexican national who was arrested to hold a sign stating “I Support Our Border Patrol” 
for photograph). See generally T IMOTHY J. DUNN, T HE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO 
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violence, as is true with respect to claims of police brutality in general,305 
appears to be linked to race profiling in immigration enforcement. Well-
publicized enforcement operations at major border crossings in Arizona, 
California, and Texas have forced undocumented Mexican and other 
minority migrants to embark on dangerous journeys through deserts and 
mountains.306 By the beginning of the year 2000, about five hundred 
deaths had been directly attributed to the new enforcement operations.307 
The lack of significant public reaction suggests that this loss of life 
generates little public concern.308 Despite the human casualties of the 
recent border enforcement measures, few legal actions have been 
brought.309 As the death toll rises, the INS hastens to comply with the 
 
 
BORDER, 1978-92 (1996) (chronicling increasing use of military force to limit immigration from 
Mexico). 
 305. See supra  text accompanying notes 48-49.  
 306. See supra  text accompanying notes 232-36. 
 307. See The California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation’s Boarder Project, Operation 
Gatekeeper Fact Sheet, at http://www.stopgatekeeper.org/English/facts (last visited Nov. 12, 2000); 
U.S. Policy on Mexico Border Irks Rights Aide, SAN DIEGO UNION-T RIB., Nov. 28, 1999, at A30. See 
also  Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship , 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 503 
(1998) (analyzing how bolstered border enforcement efforts and other changes in law has created a 
“crisis of citizenship” for Latinos); Valerie Alvord, Toxic River Becomes Path to USA, USA TODAY, 
May 11, 2000, at 1A (reporting that, to come to the United States, undocumented Mexican migrants 
cross river polluted with toxic waste that Border Patrol officers will not enter). The death toll may be 
much higher given that some bodies are never discovered and others who die on the Mexican side of 
the border may not be counted in the official statistics. See Karl Eschbach et al., Death at the Border, 
33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 430, 430 (1999) (estimating that over 1600 migrants died along 
Southwestern border from 1993 to 1997). 
 308. The human impacts of the operation of immigration law are obfuscated by the use of the 
terms “aliens” and “illegal aliens,” which tends to de-humanize those who suffer as a result of 
increased border enforcement. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The 
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996-97). As 
Professor Lucie White observed, “If we face the ones that our policies exclude, then our practices of 
making policy judgments might improve. We might be drawn toward better ways to assess the human 
costs of guarding borders . . . .” Lucie White, On the Guarding of Borders, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 183, 186 (1998). See, e.g., HING, supra note 299, at 32-43 (recounting story of immigrant client 
and friend Rodolfo Martinez Padilla); López, supra  note 151 (relaying story of undocumented Latina). 
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of 
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1227-38 (contending 
that human stories of immigrants must be circulated in attempt to prevent anti-immigrant measures and 
sentiment). 
 309. The federal government settled one action filed by environmental organizations, who 
complained that the environmental impacts of the federal government’s border enforcement measures 
violated the Endangered Species Act. See Deborah Schoch, Agency Agrees to Study Effects of Border 
Barriers, L.A. T IMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at A1; cf. Richard Delgado & Noah Markewich, Rodrigo’s 
Remonstrance: Love and Despair in an Age of Indifference—Should Humans Have Standing?, 88 
GEO. L.J. 263, 283-96 (2000) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, T HE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF 
RACE IN AMERICA  (1999); WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, T HE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-
T ERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998); LEE 
A. DANIELS, T HE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA  (1998); T ERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE 
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congressional mandate that the Attorney General hire increasing numbers 
of Border Patrol personnel and provide more arms and technology to 
enforce the border.310 
Heightened border enforcement also results in a dramatic rise in the 
fees charged by smugglers to persons seeking undocumented entry into the 
United States.311 This fee hike has contributed to the emergence of 
complex smuggling networks that require migrants to work off their debts 
to smugglers through unlawful employment, a modern form of indentured 
servitude.312 Thus, heightened border enforcement also facilitates 
exploitation of undocumented persons by employers.313 
Moreover, racial discrimination by the U.S. government encourages 
private citizens and organizations to target Latinos in the name of 
immigration enforcement. Emulating the Border Patrol’s activities along 
the southern border, private citizens have on occasion taken the law into 
their own hands. In Douglas, Arizona, armed ranchers near the border use 
force to arrest undocumented persons crossing their land, which has 
provoked threats of legal action by the Mexican government.314 Private 
citizens have shot, and sometimes killed, undocumented persons in the Rio 
Grande Valley.315 A few years ago, private citizens calling themselves the 
 
 
ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE  (1996)) (contending that racial minorities might enjoy 
more success in vindicating civil rights violations by resorting to laws protecting endangered species 
rather than those designed to protect their civil rights). 
 310. See IIRIRA §§ 101-12, 110 Stat. at 3009-553-59 (1996) (requiring Attorney General to 
increase by 1000 per year from fiscal years 1997 to 2000 the number of Border Patrol officers and 
authorizing increased use of barriers and technology for improved border enforcement). See also 
PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 89-93 (2000) (summarizing 
the large increase (148%) in Border Patrol budget and doubling of Border Patrol officers in Southwest 
in 1990s during general downsizing of federal government); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the 
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1936, 1948-49 (2000) (observing that Congress “continues to place considerable pressure on the INS 
to increase deportations” and that as a result, INS has adopted stringent interpretation of 1996 
amendments to immigration laws). 
 311. See Bersin & Feigin, supra  note 190, at 303-04. 
 312. See Nora V. Demleitner, Anti-Trafficking Measures: Criminalizing Migration and Creating 
Organized Crime? (May 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 313. See supra  text accompanying notes 151-53 (discussing exploitation of undocumented persons 
in workplace). 
 314. See Michael Janofsky, Immigrants Flood Border in Arizona, Angering Ranchers, N.Y. 
T IMES, June 18, 2000, § 1, at 1; Smita P. Nordwall & Elliot Blair Smith, Mexico Threatens to Sue 
Arizona Ranchers, USA TODAY, May 3, 2000, at 19A. See also  Peter Carlson, Buchanan’s Far Right 
Hand, WASH . POST, Sept. 13, 2000, at C01 (quoting Ezola Foster, 2000 vice presidential candidate for 
Reform Party, on undocumented Mexican immigration in Arizona: “‘The illegals come over [the 
border] into the ranches . . . . They kill their cattle. They rape their children. The children can’t play in 
the yard anymore.’”). 
 315. See Lisa Sandberg, Shootings Inflaming Tensions Along Border, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, May 28, 2000, at 1A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/1
p675 Johnson.doc  4/26/01   4:43 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] RACE PROFILING IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 733 
 
 
 
 
“Airport Posse” and wearing shirts emblazoned with the words “U.S. 
CITIZENS PATROL,” searched for “illegal aliens” at the San Diego 
airport, mainly targeting persons of Hispanic appearance.316 An anti-
immigrant organization displayed a billboard near the interstate highway 
from Arizona to California, declaring California as the “Illegal 
Immigration State.”317 All of these citizen groups claimed they were 
enforcing the law against undocumented aliens.318 At the same time, hate 
crimes against all persons of Mexican ancestry, often with an anti-
immigrant twist, rose preciptiously.319 
Immigration law historically has been a site of intense conflict between 
Latinos and Anglos with regard to status in the United States.320 Persons of 
Latin American descent fully appreciate how anti-immigrant legislation 
can veil more general anti-Latino animus.321 For example, in opposing the 
California initiative known as Proposition 187, which would have barred 
undocumented immigrants from receiving most public benefits including a 
public education, many Mexican American citizens viewed the measure as 
a broad political attack on all Mexican Americans, not just immigrants.322 
Under this measure, school teachers would be required to ask about the 
immigration status of their students. Critics feared such an inquiry would 
 
 
 316. See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. U.S. Citizens Patrol, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998); William Claiborne, ‘Airport Posse’ Takes San Diego Border Control Into Its Own Hands, 
WASH . POST, May 23, 1996, at A03. 
 317. See David Reyes & Robert Ourlian, Immigration Sign Removed Amid Threats, L.A. TIMES, 
June 24, 1998, at A1. 
 318. For analysis of the criminalization of undocumented immigrants, see Bill Ong Hing, The 
Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1998). 
 319. See CARMEN T. JOGE & SONIA M. PÉREZ, T HE MAINSTREAMING OF HATE: A REPORT ON 
LATINOS AND HARASSMENT, T HE VIOLENCE , AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ABUSE IN THE ‘90S (1999) 
(documenting reports of hate crimes and other violence and harassment directed at Latinos). See, e.g., 
Charles LeDuff, Immigrant Workers Tell of Being Lured and Beaten, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at 
B1 (reporting beating of Mexican immigrants in New York); Elizabeth Wilberg & Leonel Sanchez, 
Attack on Migrants Seen as Hate Crime, SAN DIEGO UNION-T RIB., July 8, 2000, at B1 (reporting on 
attack on Mexican nationals in migrant camp near border in San Diego). See generally IMMIGRANTS 
OUT!, supra  note 220 (analyzing growth of nativism in U.S.). 
 320. See Johnson, supra  note 24, at 1536-37. 
 321. See DAVID G. GUTIÉRREZ,  WALLS AND MIRRORS:  MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN 
IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY  212-16 (1995). At the same time, faultlines have 
developed among the established Latino community and recent Latin American immigrants on the 
issue of immigration. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. 
REV. 197 (1998). 
 322. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and 
California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. 
REV. 629, 650-61 (1995). A court enjoined implementation of Proposition 187. See League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The parties ultimately settled the 
case under terms leaving the injunction largely intact. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal 
Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles, L.A. T IMES, July 29, 1999, at A1. 
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inevitably lead to a reliance on the stereotypical, and overbroad, “Mexican 
appearance” in attempts to identify undocumented children.323 
Immigration law is not the exclusive site for conflict between Latino 
and Anglos in American social life. Other examples include the rise of 
English-only laws, language regulation in the workplace, and attacks on 
bilingual education.324 Language often serves as a convenient proxy for 
race without invoking the obvious stigma of appearing to be racist.325 
Segregation of Latinos in housing and the public schools reveals the 
limited integration of Latinos into the mainstream.326 According to a 1999 
study, “the data shows continuously increasing segregation for Latino 
students, who are rapidly becoming our largest minority group and have 
been more segregated than African Americans for several years.”327 Stark 
income disparities also reflect the status of Latinos in this country and 
highlight particularly important class issues in the community.328 
In some ways, the public attacks on undocumented immigrants may 
represent the displacement of more generalized social anxieties about all 
citizens and lawful immigrants of Latin American ancestry.329 Although 
the law generally limits the ability to discriminate against citizens and to 
some extent, lawful permanent residents, legal race-based enforcement 
allows government and the public lawfully to lash out at undocumented 
immigrants of a similar ancestry as a sort of transference or displacement 
of animus for Latinos to Latin American immigrants. A displacement 
theory helps explain why society willingly accepts the harms imposed on 
Latinos when the current border enforcement regime has proven to be 
 
 
 323. See Johnson, supra  note 24, at 1571-72. 
 324. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: 
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of 
Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997); Rachel F. 
Moran, Bilingual Education as Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321 (1987). See also Lazos, supra 
note 262, at 433-47 (analyzing motivations behind English-only measures enacted by voters in number 
of states).  
 325. See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing 
the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 863, 874 (1993). See also  Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Discrimination by Proxy: 
The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2000) 
(analyzing case study of use of language as proxy for race). 
 326. See Larson, supra  213 (studying dilapidated housing conditions for persons of Mexican 
ancestry along U.S.-Mexico border in Texas). 
 327. Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools (June 1999), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/groups/civilrights/publications/resegregation99.html (last visited Nov. 22, 
2000). 
 328. See Rachel F. Moran, Foreword—Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil 
Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 10-13 (1995). 
 329. See Johnson, supra  note 223, at 1136-40, 1154-58 (analyzing phenomenon). 
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largely symbolic in nature; border enforcement does not appear to have 
actually reduced the number of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States.330 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that the Border Patrol could consider 
race as one factor to justify an immigration stop.331 The dramatic growth 
of the Latino community, the vast majority composed of U.S. citizens and 
lawful immigrants,332 and the Court’s deep and growing commitment to 
color-blindness in its constitutional jurisprudence,333 require 
reconsideration of that ruling. The enduring commitment of the Equal 
Protection Clause to equal treatment for all people justifies the preclusion 
of the consideration of race in immigration law enforcement, even if racial 
discrimination may in some loose way facilitate immigration 
enforcement.334 Race-based immigration enforcement tangibly harms 
persons of Latin American ancestry residing lawfully in the country as 
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and stigmatizes all Latinos in 
the United States.335 
The law prohibits race profiling in criminal law enforcement for 
precisely these reasons. The injuries caused by Border Patrol consideration 
of “Hispanic appearance” in the enforcement of immigration law do not 
differ substantially from those resulting from race-based criminal law 
enforcement. Race profiling in both criminal law and immigration law 
should be outlawed because of the harms it imposes on racial minorities. 
Race profiling in immigration enforcement reveals an unpleasant truth 
about the status of Latinos in U.S. society.336 As presumed foreigners, 
Latinos have often received diluted civil rights protections. The disparity 
between the civil rights protections afforded to Latinos and other U.S. 
 
 
 330. See generally ANDREAS, supra  note 310.  
 331. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. 
 332. See supra  Part III.C.1. 
 333. See supra  text accompanying notes 242-46. 
 334. See id. 
 335. See supra  Part IV.  
 336. For a collection of readings on this subject, see Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os: 
Identity, Law and Policy, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 575 (1999); T HE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL 
READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: 
Building Latina/o Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998); 
Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997); Symposium, LatCrit 
Symposium—Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 751 (2000); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New 
Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship , 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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citizens and lawful residents337 is exemplified by the lawfulness of race 
profiling in immigration law enforcement and the unlawfulness of race 
profiling in criminal law enforcement.338 The consideration of race, a 
suspect classification under the equal protection doctrine,339 should also be 
suspect in immigration enforcement. The Supreme Court hopefully will 
repair the damage that it did to Latinos in Brignoni-Ponce and prevent race 
from justifying an immigration stop under the Fourth Amendment. 
Fundamental equality principles demand no less. 
 
 
 337. See generally George A. Martínez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the 
Mexican American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 (1994) 
(documenting failure of litigation to protect civil rights of Mexican Americans). 
 338. See supra  Part II. 
 339. See supra  text accompanying notes 242-46. 
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